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[A]bortion is legal in this country. By this veto the President will
not stop women from having abortions. But he will prevent re-
searchers from finding cures for deadly diseases.'
[Fetal research is] neither pro-choice nor pro-life-it is pro-science.
2
-Congressman Porter, commenting on
President Bush using the veto to
maintain the recent ban on federal
funding of fetal tissue research.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, over one and a half million elective abortions
occur annually.3 The fetal remains, often a macerated mass of tissue, are
usually incinerated or thrown into a dumpster.4 Recent medical research
suggests that implantation of tissue from aborted fetuses may benefit the
victims of Parkinson's disease, diabetes, Alzheimer's disease, and other
debilitating diseases, which together disable and kill millions of Americans.,
Thus, the technology of fetal tissue transplantation prevents some of the
fetal tissue from being disposed of as organic trash and enables the tissue
to be used for valuable life-saving techniques.
The technology of fetal tissue transplants, however, stands threatened
by the debate on the morality and legality of abortion. 6 In addition to the
moral and ethical concerns raised by the fact that fetal tissue is derived
from aborted fetuses, the novelty of fetal tissue transplantation has renewed
1. 138 CONG. Rac. H5090-91 (daily ed. June 24, 1992) (statement of Rep. Porter)c
2. Id. at H5090.
3. John A. Robertson, Fetal Tissue Transplants, 66 WAsH. U. L.Q. 443, 448 (1988).
Approximately 95% of elective abortions occur in the first trimester of pregnancy. Id.
4. Id. at 449; see also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 1003 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Williams, J., concurring) ("[a] common method for disposing of fetal remains in many
abortion clinics is through the local sewer system"). Some jurisdictions, however, have enacted
fetal disposal laws designed to protect human health or demonstrate respect for aborted fetuses.
See infra notes 270-93 and accompanying text (discussing state cadaver and fetal disposal
statutes).
5. See Dick Thompson, When Abortions Save Lives, TIA, Apr. 6, 1992, at 52-53. See
generally Kathleen McAuliffe, Cures From Aborted Fetal Tissue; A Startling Fount of Healing,
U.S. NEws & WoR=D REP., Nov. 3, 1986, at 68 (discussing prospects of use of fetal tissue to
cure diabetes, Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, spinal cord injuries, and cancer).
Thompson quotes a 65-year old Alabama woman whose severe Parkinson's disease is
about "80%" relieved due to an experimental fetal tissue transplant. Despite her lack of
formal training in law or ethics, her statement is perhaps the most insightful in the literature:
"If everyone involved in the debate could have Parkinson's for one month, they'd change
their minds." Thompson, supra, at 53.
6. Thompson, supra note 5, at 53; see also Robertson, supra note 3, at 443; Beverly
R. Burlingame, Note, Commercialization in Fetal-Tissue Transplantation: Steering Medical
Progress to Ethical Cures, 68 TEx. L. REv. 213, 214 (1989). Prior to abortion becoming
legalized in the 1970s, minimal opposition existed to the use of fetal tissue in medical research.
Angela M. Skerrett, Comment, Fetal Tissue Research and Abortion: Do They Have a Future
Together?, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1990).
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the debate over the protection to which a fetus may be entitled.7 Some feel
the crux of the controversy over experimentation with aborted fetuses is the
conflict between the competing interests of protecting the unborn and
advancing medical science.8 Others, however, feel that once the fetus is
aborted, it has no interest to protect. Even though the transplantation of
fetal tissue is experimental, the subject of the experiment is not the fetus,
but rather the recipient of the transplant.9
The debate about abortion must be separated from the subsequent use
of fetal tissue if scientists are to make progress in a technology that can
offer hope and relief to several million Americans.' 0 Although both of the
authors support the right of reproductive choice and therefore the right to
abortion, this Article will address its arguments to those who oppose
abortion. It will be demonstrated that even those who oppose abortion have
no plausible, logical basis for opposing fetal tissue research. The recent
federal "pro-life" moratorium" on fetal research, for example, was a victory
of blind emotion over logic.
If fetal tissue research on electively aborted fetuses is to continue,
further controversy exists over who should decide whether to donate fetal
remains. There are some reasons to challenge the placing of decision-making
power solely with the mother. Yet, no alternative exists which is more
feasible and which would not unduly burden the mother's right to choose
abortion for reasons unrelated to the use of fetal tissue. Further, the major
objections to a maternal power of disposition-that doctors in need of
tissue will encourage women to have abortions and that some women will
conceive solely to abort and gain tissue for themselves or relatives-can be
easily overcome by narrowly tailored restrictions.
7. See generally Robertson, supra note 3, at 447-63. Bioethical issues arise in obtaining
tissue from a cadaver that is clearly dead because the resulting tissue contains cells that have
the potential to survive for a short time following the death of the cadaver. Tamar Lewin,
Medical Use of Fetal Tissue Spurs New Abortion Debate, N.Y. Timms, Aug. 16, 1987, at 1.
8. Albert R. Jonsen, Transplantation of Fetal Tissue: An Ethicist's Viewpoint, 36
CLmNcAL RFs. 215 (1988).
9. Id. at 218.
10. On a world-wide basis, the potential becomes astronomical.
11. But see infra note 92 and accompanying text (arguing that true motivation for
moratorium may not be sanctity of life). A particularly insightful student commentator notes,
[t]ragically, the interest which the ban on federal funding sought to protect most of
all, that of the fetus, suffers most greatly for it. Without the force of the federal
regulations protecting human subjects of research, human fetuses involved in trans-
plantation research could conceivably be artificially kept alive ... until such time
as their tissues can be harvested for use.
Theodore M. Hess-Mahan, Note, Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research: Entering a
Brave New World, 23 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 789, 823 (1989). The Clinton administration
promptly lifted the ban, provoking a debate about funding. See Federal Funding of Fetal
Tissue Transplantation Research, 58 Fed. Reg. 7457 (1993) (memorandum from President
Clinton to Secretary of Health and Human Services lifting moratorium on federal funding of
fetal tissue research); see also Steven Greehouse, Settling In: Abortion Policy; Protest and
Praise Over Clinton's Orders, N.Y. Timms, Jan. 24, 1993, § 1, at 21.
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Finally, there are discreet areas in which the state may justifiably limit
the mother's decisional authority in order to protect the public health or to
protect the dignity of the fetus, itself, as a dead body. These areas will be
identified and carefully limited. It is important to keep in mind in evaluating
such limitations, however, that the abortion question is unrelated to the
mother's right to choose whether to donate fetal remains and legitimate
state regulation should not be used surreptitiously as a means to strike out
at abortion.
Part II of this Article discusses technological developments and explains
certain aspects of the medical background, an understanding of which is
crucial to the discussion that follows. Part III discusses the debate over
using legal and governmental institutions to encourage fetal tissue trans-
plantation research. Part IV outlines the law regulating the use of fetal
tissue. Part V discusses the question of who should decide whether or not
to donate fetal remains and concludes that this decisional authority should
rest with the mother. Part VI discusses those restrictions on this decisional
authority which the state may and may not rightfully impose. Part VII
offers a conclusion and summarizes the trends in the law in relation to the
fetal tissue transplantation issue.
II. BACKGROUND
Although fetal tissue transplantation is still highly experimental, recent
medical studies involving tissue from aborted fetuses suggest that it may be
an effective therapy for diseases in which degenerative processes or traumatic
injuries have destroyed vital tissue. 12 Scientists estimate that fetal tissue
transplants could help approximately "one million Parkinson's patients; 2.5
to 3 million persons affected with Alzheimer's disease; 25,000 persons
suffering from Huntington's disease; 600,000 Type I diabetics; 400,000
stroke victims; and several hundred thousand persons who have suffered a
spinal cord injury." 13 In total nearly five million lives might be saved in
the United States alone. Currently, fetal transplantation experiments are
underway for the treatment of many other diseases including sickle cell
anemia, leukemia, and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). 14
Success of this research could vastly raise the number of persons whose
lives could be saved.
Fetal tissue transplantation involves injecting electively aborted fetal
tissue into another human being.' 5 Many chronic illnesses, such as diabetes
and Parkinson's disease, destroy cells that normally produce hormones,
12. See, e.g., Burlingame, supra note 6, at 217.
13. Emanuel D. Thorne, Regulating Commerce in Fetal Tissue, Soc'y, Nov.-Dec. 1988,
at 61.
14. Rachel B. Gold & Dorothy Lehrman, Fetal Research Under Fire: The Influence of
Abortion Politics, 21 FAm. PLAN. PERS'. 6, 7 (1989).
15. Mark W. Danis, Note, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 1079, 1083 (1988).
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enzymes, and other chemicals essential to healthy bodily function. 6 Because
drug therapy treats only the symptoms, most cellular malfunctions are
incurable except through transplantation.17 Scientists maintain that fetal cells
from induced abortions are the best option for such transplants. 8
Although alternatives to using fetal tissue for transplant purposes are
presently available, these alternatives have proven to be less successful than
fetal implants. Fetal tissue is vastly superior to adult tissue for transplant
purposes. The most common problems for adult tissue transplants are the
lack of compatible donors and the risk of rejection by the recipient's
immune system.' 9 These two obstacles are enormous. The scarcity of donors
is extreme. 20 Immunosuppressive drugs decrease the likelihood of rejection,
but those drugs lower the patient's resistance to disease and the patient
frequently succumbs to some random infection (as do AIDS patients) even
though the transplant might have been successful.
2'
Fetal cells are immunologically naive. A cell is considered to be im-
munologically naive when the distinctive antigens particular to that cell and
its specialized function have yet to develop. 22 To optimize this effect, fetal
tissue is generally obtained from fetuses aborted during or near the first
16. Burlingame, supra note 6, at 217. Fetal neural tissue transplantation has been
successful in lessening the symptoms of chemically induced Parkinson's disease in primates.
See generally John R. Sladek, Jr., et al., Transplantation of Fetal Neurons in Primates, 36
CLNCAL REs. 200 (1988). Initial trials in humans have had great success in treating Parkinson's
disease. "Nearly all of the handful of transplants performed for Parkinson's have produced
dramatic results . . . ." Thompson, supra note 5, at 52. Transplants have cured diabetes and
restored some sight in animal experiments, and have repaired some spinal cord injuries in
animals. Id. To date only about 600 people have received fetal cell transplants that have
effectively treated Di George Syndrome, a rare and fatal genetic disease, and Parkinson's
disease. Id. at 52-53. Success has also been achieved with Hurler's syndrome, a rare and fatal
genetic disease. Id. at 53. Attempts to treat the victims of Chernobyl have failed to regenerate
bone marrow. Id. This was, of course, only the first trial, and further experimentation might
prove successful. Dramatic success with animals in treating diabetes has not yet been duplicated
in humans. Some improvement has been noted but no case to date has improved enough to
eliminate the need for insulin completely. Id. Only two centers in the United States perform
fetal cell transplants, and at least one American surgeon flies his patients to China to perform
the transplants because of the current moratorium. Id.
17. Burlingame, supra note 6, at 217.
18. Id. at 217-18.
19. Id. at 217; Danis, supra note 15, at 1082.
20. Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model
Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. Rav. 681 (1988); Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72
MICH. L. Rnv. 1182 (1974). This scarcity is the reason for the 1987 amendments to section 4
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 cmt.;
infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (discussing section 4 of UAGA).
One student commentator argues that the main reason for the shortage of adult-cadaver
tissue is the failure of the medical profession to accept donations in cases when the decedent
agreed to donate. See Daniel G. Jardine, Comment, Liability Issues Arising Out of Hospitals'
and Organ Procurement Organizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and
Consequences, 1990 Wis. L. Rnv. 1655.
21. RussELL ScoTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 48, 50 (1981).
22. Danis, supra note 15, at 1083-84.
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trimester of pregnancy. 23 Since fetal cells are immunologically naive, trans-
planted fetal tissue is highly unlikely to cause compatibility problems. Tissue
typing need not be as specific as with adult tissue, and the likelihood of
rejection is quite low. 24 Additionally, and most importantly, fetal cells,
because of their immaturity, have the capacity to regenerate and grow once
transplanted into a recipient's body, thereby taking over ithe functions of
the unhealthy cells and making the new nerve connections that are necessary
to render the transplant effective.
25
Theoretically, the tissue used for a fetal tissue transplant can come from
either a spontaneous abortion (miscarriage) or an elective abortion. 26 In
practice, however, the tissue comes from electively aborted fetuses. 27 Spon-
taneous abortions are not a suitable source of tissue due to the increased
probability that defective fetal pathology may have triggered the miscarriage
and the uncertain delay between fetal tissue death and subsequent expulsion
from the uterus.
28
Several factors, such as the timing of the transplantation and the
maturity of the fetal tissue, affect the success of the transplantation pro-
cedure. The timing of transplantation is crucial because fetal cells cease to
function and develop a few hours after the abortion procedure. 29 The
maturity of the fetus also affects the quality of the tissue. For example,
the optimal tissue for treatment of Parkinson's disease comes from a fetus
gestated no longer than nine weeks, while the best time to obtain fetal islet
cells from the pancreas for treatment of diabetes is during the fourteenth
week of gestation.
3 0
23. Id. at 1084. The earlier cells are retrieved, the less the chance of rejection and,
correspondingly, the lower the needed doses of immunosuppressive drugs. This benefit,
however, must be counterbalanced against the advantage of greater cell identity and organ
development needed for treating certain diseases. See infra note 30 and accompanying text
(noting that optimal maturity of fetal tissue varies for different diseases).
24. Danis, supra note 15, at 1084. When the receipient's immune system attacks the
transplanted tissue, this is called rejection, or rejecting the transplant. On the other hand,
when transplanted tissue attacks the host tissue in the recipient's body, this is often referred
to as the graft-versus-host reaction. Both of these problems are greatly reduced by using fetal
tissue. See generally Joe Levine, Help from the Unborn: Fetal-Cell Surgery Raises Hopes-
and Issues, Timm, Jan. 12, 1987, at 62. Since the likelihood of rejection is not a significant
factor, no need exists for relatives to act as donors. See supra note 22 and accompanying text
(noting that fetal tissue is immunologically naive).
25. Ania M. Frankowska, Note, Fetal Tissue Transplants: A Proposal to Amend the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1095, 1097.
26. Alan Fine, The Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplants, HAsnNos CmR. RaP., June/July
1988, at 6. In addition, some abortions are required by the medical condition of the mother
or the fetus, including ectopic pregnancies. Thompson, supra note 5, at 52-53.
27. Fine, supra note 26, at 6; Thompson, supra note 5, at 53.
28. Fine, supra note 26, at 6; Thompson, supra note 5, at 53.
29. Mary B. Mahowald et al., The Ethical Options in Transplanting Fetal Tissue,
HAsTnNos CTR. REP., Feb. 1987, at 10.
30. Thomas H. Maugh, II, Use of Fetal Tissue Spurs. Hot Debate, L.A. TIMts, Apr.
16, 1988, at 28. The appropriate stage of fetal development for treating all diseases, however,
remains unclear. Leon Jaroff, Steps Toward A Brave New World, Tvn,, July 13, 1987, at 57.
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Further, the type of abortion procedure employed will affect the quality
of the tissue. A hysterotomy provides superior tissue because the fetus is
damaged least. This technique, however, presents the greatest danger to the
pregnant woman. A hysterotomy is similar to a caesarian section delivery;
the woman's abdomen and uterus are surgically opened to allow removal
of the fetus. 3' In contrast, dilation and evacuation procedures, which affect
the pregnant woman the least,32 are the most destructive to the' fetus.
Dilation and evacuation may not produce intact organs. However, even in
those circumstances, scientists have been able to collect cells from the tissue
fragments and successfully use them for transplantation.
33
Accordingly, the primary source of fetal tissue will be electively aborted,
nonviable34 fetuses, aborted most often by means of dilation and evacuation.
Currently, the amount of fetal tissue retrievable from routinely performed
legal abortions greatly exceeds the anticipated demand for transplantable
tissue. 5 Many details about the technology of fetal tissue transplant are
unknown. Because the technology is relatively new, scientists have not had
a chance to study the long-term effectiveness of fetal tissue in the treatment
of degenerative diseases. 36 Additionally, scientists do not yet know the exact
amount of tissue required to effectively treat Parkinson's disease, diabetes,
or other specific disorders.37 It remains undisputed, however, that the readily
available supply of usable fetal tissue from voluntary legal abortions and
fetal tissue's adaptability for transplantation without careful donor matching
make its use an attractive option to medical researchers.
3
1
At the time of this writing, a federal moratorium on fetal tissue research
has only recently ended.39 The reach of this moratorium and of the federal
regulations relating to fetal tissue research seems to have confused the legal
scholars. Some authors characterize the federal ban as limited to research
31. Frankowska, supra note 25, at 1099 n.36.
32. Id. at 1098. Notably, the dilation and pvacuation procedure is considerably safer for
the woman than giving birth. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973).
33. Fine, supra note 26, at 6.
34. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing definition of "nonviable").
35. Fine, supra note 26, at 6; see also infra' notes 53, 63 and accompanying text.
Professor Nicholas Terry, on the other hand, believes the demand will exceed the supply,
basing this assertion on the unreasonable assumption that all of the five to ten million people
who might be treated will have to be supplied with fetal tissue in one year. Nicholas Terry,
Politics and Privacy: Refining the Ethical and Legal Issues in Fetal Tissue Transplantation,
66 WAsH. U. L.Q. 523, 528 (1988). He also notes the progress toward laboratory grown cells
reducing the shortage in any event. Id. at 529. Further, he falls to take into account the fact
that each fetus has as many as 10 relevant organs. Cf. Jardine, supra note 20, at 1656 (noting
that adult cadavers typically supply seven recipients: two kidneys, two lungs, one heart, liver,
and pancreas).
36. Danis, supra note 15, at 1085.
37. Thompson, supra note 5, at 53.
38. Fine, supra note 26, at 6.
39. See supra note 11 (noting that Clinton administration has lifted ban on federal
funding of fetal tissue research).
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by federal agencies and specific research projects using federal funds, 4° while
others portray the ban as stopping fetal tissue research at institutions which
receive any federal funds.41 The latter interpretation, obviously, created a
much broader moratorium because, under it, an institution receiving any
federal funds could not perform privately funded fetal tissue research.
In truth, however, the federal regulations are limited to federal agencies
and the use of federal funds to support specific research projects. 42 However,
many nongovernmental entities such as universities, hospitals, private lab-
oratories, and medical schools blindly follow such federal regulations by
virtue of bureaucratic inertia and a lack of understanding of the limits of
the federal government's power. 43 Thus, federal regulations and the recent
moratorium have had an effect on private conduct that is not constitutionally
within the federal government's reach.
Further adding to the confusion, there have been unsubstantiated hints
that the federal government might invoke 45 C.F.R. § 46.123(b), a regulation
unrelated to fetal research. This regulation permits the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to terminate all funding to any institution if the
Secretary determines that researchers have "materially failed to discharge
[their] responsibility for the protection of the rights and welfare of human
subjects." 44 This section is applicable to all research involving human
subjects, whether or not federal funds are involved, and is claimed to be
effective pursuant to the spending power4s because the sanction is the
withholding of federal funds for any research. Thus, even privately funded
research must conform to federal guidelines unless the institution is prepared
to risk losing all other federal funding.
This use of this regulation, however, depends on the assertion that
nonviable or, most often, dead fetuses are "human subjects" for the
purposes of the law. This characterization is not consistent with the purpose
of the federal regulation, protecting human subjects, 46 as adopted during
40. See Jenn S. Bregman, Comment, Conceiving to Abort and Donate Fetal Tissue: New
Ethical Strains in the Transplantation Field-A Survey of Existing Law and a Proposal For
Change, 36 UCLA L. REv. 1167, 1177 (1989).
41. See Chrysso B. Sarkos, Note, The Fetal Tissue Transplant Debate in the United
States: Where is King Solomon When You Need Him?, 7 J.L. & POL. 379, 399 n.112 (1991);
infra note 44 and accompanying text; infra note 74.
42. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(a) (1987).
43. See Sarkos, supra note 41, at 403-04 nn.134-38 and accompanying text; infra note
74.
44. 45 C.F.R. § 46.123(b) (1989) (emphasis added).
45. The authority of the federal government to regulate conduct otherwise beyond its
reach through the spending power is too well established to require citation. It rests, however,
on an entirely unsound analytical basis. The states, for example, can regulate (or allow freedom
in) research on human subjects. The federal government claims this power, at the expense of
the states' authority, when it funds research. Yet the taxes which create the federal funds
come from the people in the states. If federal taxes were lower, states could tax at higher
rates to support such research. So, the federal government really only returns the money to
the states from which it came.
46. For example, applying the requirements for human subjects as they are currently
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the 1970s, and it runs afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v.
Wade47 that a fetus is not a person; otherwise it could not be aborted.
4
For example, when state statutes have attempted to define nonviable fetuses
as persons in an effort to support a state interest in their protection from
the time of conception, courts have held that such definitions are prohibited
by Roe.
49
III. FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS AND ABORTION
Since the principal source of fetal tissue for transplants is elective
abortions, those who oppose abortion have opposed fetal tissue transplant
research.50 Both authors support the right of reproductive choice, and it is
assumed that those readers holding a similar view will need little persuasion
to accept fetal tissue research in view of its significant benefits. However,
even those who support the "right to life" movement have no plausible
basis for opposing fetal tissue research. Accordingly, the arguments that
follow are directed to those who oppose abortion and are framed from that
perspective.
At the outset, it must be conceded that abortion will remain legal for
the foreseeable future in at least some states."1 Thus, legally aborted tissue
will be available and abortion for family planning reasons will continue to
occur. If elective abortions were to somehow become illegal in all states,
the question of fetal tissue research would become largely moot since
virtually no supply of tissue would exist. Tissue from spontaneous abortions
might be used at that point, despite its lower quality.5 2 Perhaps, tissue from
written would mean that nonviable or dead fetuses must be told about the risks of the
experiment, asked to give consent, and told that they may withdraw from the experiment at
any time. See 45 C.F.R. § 116 (1987). See generally George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark:
The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL 'Y 17 (1991).
47. 410.U.S. 113 (1973).
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973); see infra note 203.
49. See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 377, 379-80 (N.D. I11. 1983) (state statute
defining "human being" as "the individual from fertilization until death" violates Roe's
contrary holding).
50. Gold & Lehrman, supra note 14, at 7-8; Jonsen, supra note 8, at 215-19; Robertson,
supra note 3, at 443; Skerrett, supra note 6, at 82; Thompson, supra note 5, at 52-53.
51. See infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text. If abortion is legal in any reasonably
nearby state, the decision of any given state to make abortion illegal is unlikely to significantly
reduce the overall number of abortions because women from that state will travel to the
nearby state where abortion is legal. See also Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right
to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MIcH. L. Rv. 873 (1993); Seth F.
Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom .. .": The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial
Abortions, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 907 (1993); Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of
Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism,
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451 (1992); Andrew J. Ries, Note, Extraterritoriality of Restrictive State
Abortion Laws: States Can Abort Plans to Abort at Home but not Abroad, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1205 (1992). But see Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions? No Thanks: A
Response to Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 MICH. L. Rv. 939 (1993).
52. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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foreign abortions might also be used if it can be preserved for transporta-
tion, 3 but this would again mean a legal source of aborted tissue.
54
A. The Success of Fetal Tissue Transplant Research
Will Not Encourage Abortions
Obviously, the major reason for elective abortions is family planning.
Nonetheless, fetal tissue transplant research is, according to its opponents,
likely to increase the number of abortions.55 Clear statements of this
argument are lacking. 56 Yet four related subarguments are being made, and
they will be discussed here in turn.
In the first variant, opponents of fetal tissue research assert that the
successful use of fetal tissue will cause some women to conceive solely for
the purpose of aborting to supply themselves or relatives with fetal tissue.1
7
For example, a California woman recently expressed her desire to become
pregnant and abort the fetus for the sole purpose of supplying fetal tissue
to her father, a Parkinson's disease victim.5 8 Because several other cases
have been reported of women desiring to conceive for the sole purpose of
53. Fetal tissue can be frozen. See Danis, supra note 15, at 1084. It is not known for
certain if frozen tissue can be used for all purposes, because successful use for most purposes
has not yet been achieved. Also, human tissue can survive, divide, and even grow in a tissue
culture medium. Id. at 1085; Kenneth Ryan, Tissue Transplantation From Aborted Fetuses,
Organ Transplantation From Anencephalic Infants and Keeping Braid-Dead Pregnant Women
Alive Until Fetal Viability, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 683 (1991).
The New York Times reports that the importation of foreign fetal tissue has begun. See
Clinic to Import Fetal Tissue From Russia, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1993, § 1, at 19.
54. Further, American women would be likely to travel to foreign countries and continue
to have abortions, especially if it remained possible to do so in Canada where the quality of
health care is high and the distance is not great.
55. See, e.g., Burlingame, supra note 6, at 214 n.5; Thompson, supra note 5, at 52-53
(quoting Assistant Secretary for Health James Mason, Bush administration). Notably, at least
one state has actually enacted a statute specifically prohibiting medical transplantation of fetal
tissue known to have been procured by abortions done for the purpose of supplying fetal
tissue. See Susan Frelich Appleton, More Thoughts on the Physician's Constitutional Role in
Abortion and Related Choices, 66 WAsH. U. L.Q. 499, 512-13 (1988). Massachusetts has
enacted a somewhat similar statute. See Arthur Bauer, Fetal Tissue Transplantation, TRIuAL,
July 1990, at 24.
56. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 5, at 52-53, quoting Mason, "[The research] cannot
help tilting some already vulnerable women toward a decision to have an abortion." The
suggestion that individual women who are considering abortion would be swayed by such a
tangential factor is utterly unrealistic, and is certainly his weakest argument.
57. Id.; Emanuel Thorne, Trade in Human Tissue Needs Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug.
19, 1987, at 16 (discussing woman attempting to aid ailing father who considered artificial
insemination with father's sperm to produce fetus for abortion); Express: Fetal Cell Transplants
(KQED television broadcast, Mar. 1, 1988) (woman suffering from diabetes expressed interest
in becoming pregnant to supply herself with fetal pancreatic tissue). Notably, the UAGA
permits the donor to specify the recipient of donated tissue. This provision, while advisable
in the case of adult tissue donations is unwise in the context of fetal tissue, and should be
amended. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
58. Christine Gorman, A Balancing Act of Life and Death, TImE, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49.
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aborting the fetus,5 9 the opponents of fetal tissue transplantation maintain
that beneficial use of fetal tissue would result in an increase in abortions.60
59. See supra note 57.
60. Professor John A. Robertson argues that if it were necessary to do so, conceiving
to abort or aborting a pregnancy which would not otherwise have been aborted is ethically
defensible. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 456-63. His arguments certainly will not persuade
persons opposed to abortion, and had only a modest effect on the pro-choice authors of this
Article.
His analysis is essentially a greatest-benefit-type rational analysis. It uses as a basis a
situation where a loved one will die if not cured of a degenerative disease. Although Robertson
does not use such a system, let us show the false rationality of his analysis by assigning
numerical values to the losses and gains. Assume that saving the loved one's life is valued at
(+)100 points. What, then, is the negative value of the loss of the fetus needed to gain 100
points? First, he argues that previability fetuses "are insufficiently developed to experience
harm," and thus count for no harm (0) ("It does not harm or wrong them"). Id. at 458.
Alternatively, he argues that most of society values early stage fetuses less than fully developed
persons and, so, they must be worth less than (-)100 points; say (-)50 points. Id. Therefore,
a net gain of 50 points would still occur.
He concedes that "some people think that fetuses ... have the full value of persons."
Id. Yet he never explores the effect of this premise-obviously the premise of the anti-abortion
portion of society. Also, for those who count fetuses as less than persons, but not nothing,
Robertson's relative value argument (which we have accentuated by the use of our point
system) is itself socially unacceptable. We are unwilling to be so coldly rational. Such logic
would mean that we, as lawyers and scholars (+ 150), could murder any janitor (-80) who has
an organ we need to survive (a net gain of 70 points). Also, the assertion that a fetus is not
harmed because it cannot experience harm is a non-sequitur which suggests that we should
murder the janitor while he is asleep (0).
Also, since a single body can supply the organs to save several people, no one would be
safe. We could easily justify the benefit of saving five lives (+500) simply by killing the first
healthy person we see (-100) after we have located five people in need of the right combination
of organs.
Further, Robertson argues that, if abortion is acceptable when the only gain will be
family-planning (perhaps 30), then abortion to obtain tissue to save another person's life
certainly is (100). Id. at 459-60. Presumably, if people are rational, the value of the fetus
must be less than the value of family planning (30), so the value of the fetus is clearly less
than the life of a loved one (100). Following this rational comparison logic, members of the
armed forces are at great risk. Since our society is willing to see our soldiers die for security
in the Persian Gulf (perhaps 30), if a loved one (100) needs a heart transplant, we should kill
any soldier to obtain his heart (net gain of +70). The fact that people do not make judgments
on such a basis is highlighted by a hypothetical conundrum presented when the loved one
(100) is a soldier (30).
While the argument appears persuasive that saving a loved one's life is more important
than family planning, the simplistic syllogistic step to the conclusion that aborting to save a
loved one is more acceptable than aborting for family planning is unpersuasive because the
mechanical calculus necessary to make it robs us of what we value as our humanity.
Professor Robertson employs his greatest-benefit analysis only in the case of a fetus, and
he undoubtedly would not endorse the logical extreme to which we have taken his argument.
His other writings make clear that the logical fulcrum of his position is that personhood has
not yet attached to the fetus. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal
Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. Rav. 437 (1990). Therefore, the fetus has only symbolic
or emotional value, which cannot exceed the value of the life or lives of person(s) it can be
used to save. That symbolic value cannot be more valuable than human life is debatable; the
United States has fought many wars over symbolic values, and many people have willingly
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On the other hand, no reported instances exist of women actually conceiving
and aborting to supply such tissue.
6'
More importantly, simply no reason exists for women to do so. Because
fetal tissue is immunologically naive, 62 tissue matching is not needed. While
having a blood relative make the donation greatly increases the chances of
success in adult tissue transplants, only ignorance of the medical facts causes
people to assume that the same benefit would inure to the use of relative's
tissue in fetal tissue transplants.
Also, unlike adult tissue transplants, there is no shortage of donated
tissue. This is due to two factors. First, one and a half million elective
family planning abortions already are performed annually. 63 Even if changes
in law 64 reduced this number, the supply still would exceed the demand.
Second, unlike adult tissue transplants, in which whole organs or large
grafts are often needed, fetal tissue transplants involve injecting, rather than
surgically attaching, a small cluster of cells. Accordingly, a single donated
organ may serve many recipients. 6 Also, a single aborted fetus obviously
has many organs. Even a dramatic decrease in the current family planning
abortion rate would not endanger the needed supply of fetal tissue.
died to defend symbolic values.
In assessing Professor Robertson's argument, a question of first principles is presented.
Views on abortion tend to fall into three groups: (1) those who believe fetuses are not yet
persons and therefore may be aborted; (2) those who believe fetuses are persons and therefore
may not be aborted; and (3) those who believe fetuses are persons (or something less than
persons but of significant value) but may be aborted anyway. Judith Thomson's classic
statement of the third analytical group, which includes the present authors, is that even if a
fetus has the value of a person (she employs a talented violinist to heighten her point), it has
no right to enslave another for its survival. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion,
1 PmiL. & PuB. AFFAmS 47 (1971). Dean Calabresi elevates this concept to a broader view of
legal analysis in which even the right to life is candidly balanced against basic social ideals,
such as the basic social ideal of equal participation in essential societal activities. Guimo
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFs, ATrrrun=s AND THE LAW 99-108 (1985). In the case of abortion,
involuntary childbearing deprives women of equal participation in life's activities (sexual and
non-sexual). Id. at 94-114.
Naturally, Robertson's argument will persuade the first of these three groups because the
first group comprises people who already believe a fetus has little or no value. Members of
the latter two groups must also be persuaded, however. While we have argued that even those
who oppose abortion should be willing to benefit from abortions which will take place anyway,
we do not feel that an argument can be made in support of pregnancy for the sole purpose
of aborting to obtain fetal tissue which will persuade anyone who is not already of the opinion
that fetuses have little or no value.
61. Danis, supra note 15, at 1080.
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
64. If states merely place restrictions on abortion, such as waiting periods, the number
of abortions will not be significantly reduced, although women may find the process more
upsetting and stressful. If Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1974), were to be overruled and some
states outlawed abortion entirely, this would have some effect, but most women would simply
travel to other states or into Canada to have abortions. See supra note 51.
65. For example, a procedure has been developed to produce enough cells from one fetal
pancreas to treat 20 adult diabetics. See Danis, supra note 15, at 1085.
FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH
One reason that some of the more desperate advocates will assert is
that by having a specific donor a recipient can avoid the transmission of
AIDS. The risk of such transmission is extremely low, and the fear that
seems to surround AIDS is entirely out of proportion to reality.6 Tissue
can be tested for AIDS, 67 as can aborting mothers, and the risk of AIDS
can be reduced to absurdly low levels. In such cases the risk from pregnancy
and abortion to the woman who becomes pregnant and aborts just to create
AIDS-free tissue is far greater than risk of AIDS, and no reasonable person
could possibly pursue such a course. 68
Ironically, the recent, supposedly anti-abortion, moratorium on fetal
tissue research creates the only plausible incentive to conceive for the purpose
of aborting to obtain fetal tissue, and that moratorium may cause such
additional abortions. Because of the moratorium no well-coordinated re-
search network has been set up. Some patients in need of fetal tissue, and
able to arrange a privately funded treatment, may only be able to have the
treatment if they can find an ad hoc supply of fetal tissue.
The second possible variant of the argument that the use of fetal tissue
will increase the number of abortions is the assertion that individual doctors
interested in using fetal tissue will exert undue influence on patients who
are seeking their medical advice in deciding whether or not to abort. Very
few if any doctors actually play these two incompatible roles of gynecologist
and Alzheimer's disease researcher, so the argument is most likely only a
makeweight. Further, the "Chinese wall" technique, discussed below,69
required by federal regulations and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA), makes the argument even more tenuous. In the end, however,
this second variant, like the first, is based on the unfounded assumption
that a shortage of supply exists. With an excess of supply, there is no
reason to pressure any uncertain mother to abort.
66. For example, many concerns have been expressed about sending children to school
when a child in the class has AIDS. Clearly, the risk of dying in an accident while riding to
school on the school bus is far greater than the danger of contracting AIDS, yet it does not
arouse the same intensity of fear.
67. For example, some states have enacted as part of their version of the UAGA a
requirement that all transplant tissue be tested for the HIV virus. See, e.g., Section 23-18.6-
12 of the Rhode Island Act, added in 1989:
23-18.6-12 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Testing. Prior to any organ,
tissue, or part of a human body being transplanted in any human being, the donor
shall be tested for the presence of antibodies to the probable causative agent for
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), provided that this condition shall not
apply if there is a bona fide documentable medical emergency which endangers the
life of any person. If the test [sic] for the presence of the antibodies is positive, the
organ, tissue, or body part shall not be used.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.6-12 (1989); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-11.1 (1991).
68. Of course, some unreasonable people might choose to become pregnant and abort
just to create AIDS-free tissue. Even this possibility is further reduced because the patient in
need of a transplant would obviously be under the care of, and receiving advice from, a
physician. Further, the risk of getting AIDS by having sex or artificial insemination to get
pregnant must be taken into account.
69. See infra notes 135, 157-59 and accompanying text.
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The third possible variant envisions a monetary incentive-aborting
mothers being paid to deliver transplantable fetuses. Again, the excess of
supply makes this unlikely. Further, the sale of such body parts is already
a crime,70 further reducing the likelihood that such a fetal tissue market
will emerge and cause indigent mothers to abort.
The fourth possible variant of the argument that beneficial use of fetal
tissue will result in more abortions is directed to the legality of abortion
itself. 7' Individual women do not alter their decision whether or not to
abort because of so tangential a factor as the possibility of beneficial use
of the fetal tissue. This is so even when the decision is an agonizing one.7 2
Yet, our society as a whole is agonizing over abortion in the legislative and
judicial arenas. Here, it may be justifiably asserted that the presence of a
lifesaving use for fetal tissue might tip the balance in the minds of some
voters, legislators, or judges. Also, the excess of supply is somewhat less
relevant as courts and legislators may take action which could reduce the
supply dramatically-at least within the United States or regions of the
United States.7
70. Many states prohibit the sale of fetal tissue. See infra note 170 and accompanying
text. In 1984 Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act to prohibit the sale of
human organs in interstate commerce, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1988). In 1988 the Act was
amended to specifically cover fetal tissue and organs. See Frankowska, supra note 25, at 1104.
The National Organ Transplant Act does not apply to the use of human organs or fetal tissue
for research purposes. The meaning of "research," however, is extremely unclear. Cf. Margaret
S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986) ("experiment" in fetal transplant context
unconstitutionally vague). It would probably be best to amend the statute to prohibit the sale
of fetal tissue for all purposes.
Two student commentators interestingly argue that allowing the sale of fetal tissue will
reduce the supply, rather than increase it. Paul A. Gerike, Comment, Human Biological
Material: A Proprietary Interest or Part of the Monistic Being?, 17 Omo N.U. L. REv. 805,
823-24 (1991); Jennifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 75 VA. L. Rnv. 1363, 1384 (1989). The former
summarizes,
The supply of donor organs would also be adversely affected by the recognition of
a property right in human tissue. Creating a market for organs "would constrain
patients' willingness to donate freely organs or tissue." A donor would lose the
altruistic motive because of the potential monetary rewards. The perception of the
donor card would be transformed from an expression of generosity to a legally
binding contract. This would deter many who fear they would be making an
irrevocable obligation. Even if donors were not discouraged, the already low supply
of organs would dwindle because health care organizations would not be able to
afford to pay prospective donors in order to increase the amount available. Fur-
thermore, if payment could be made, it would induce those with diseased organs to
donate. This has been evidenced in the payment for blood predicament.
Gerike, supra, at 823-24 (footnotes omitted). See generally Thomas H. Murray, On the Human
Body as Property: The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets, and the Meaning of Strangers, 20
U. MICH. J.L. RP. 1055 (1987).
71. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 3, at 447, 453.
72. Further, the tissue is not badly needed due to the already ample supply. Therefore
possible beneficial use of fetal tissue should not factor into a woman's decision.
73. But see infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
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Yet this argument is the same as that of the Luddites, who smashed
machines hoping to stop the coming of automation. If it is true that fetal
tissue can be used to save lives, there is no way to stop this medical fact
from coming forward. At present, research is taking place in the United
States at a more limited rate due to the lack of government funding. Even
if such research were made illegal, 74 it would continue outside the United
States. 7 Thus, the time ultimately will come when the opponents of abortion
will have to argue against abortion despite the added fact that fetal tissue
from abortions can save lives.
If fetal tissue transplants are as successful as one may hope, abortions
could indirectly save lives-possibly almost as many per year as are lost
through abortions-and this fact may be a significant arrow in the pro-
choice quiver. Those who oppose abortion will simply have to face this
fact. Galileo's forced recantations 6 did not stop the knowledge of how our
solar system operates, although no doubt some delay was caused. 77 The
Luddites did not stop automation, and hardly achieved even a delay. If it
were possible to stop knowledge of the benefits of fetal tissue transplants
from coming forward, then those who oppose abortion would have a
somewhat perverse, but plausible, argument for stopping fetal tissue re-
search. In reality, such an obstruction can be no more than temporary. The
knowledge will ultimately come out. In view of the benefits, delaying the
inevitable effect on the abortion debate for a decade or two hardly seems
74. This Article assumes arguendo that such research can be made illegal. But see James
R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and The First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639 (1979);
Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 417 (1987); Al Gore, Federal Biotechnology Policy: The Perils of Progress
and the Risks of Uncertainty, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 965 (1987); Harold P. Green, Consti-
tutional Implications of Federal Restrictions on Scientific Research and Communication, 60
UMKC L. REv. 619 (1992); John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A
Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203 (1978); Michael D. Fricklas, Note, Executive
Order 12,356: The First Amendment Rights of Government Grantees, 64 B.U. L. REv. 447
(1984). Also, restrictions on the use of fetal tissue that are not applicable to adult cadaver
tissue are suspect on equal protection grounds. See infra notes 203-15 and accompanying text.
Further, the matter would not be under any area of federal control, probably escaping even
the reach of the ubiquitous interstate commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The
present federal moratorium is limited to research supported by federal funds. Therefore, all
50 states would have to make the research illegal concurrently, a highly unlikely event.
75. For example, the Pope banned astronomical research after the trial of Galileo, but
the ban was ineffective because research continued outside of Italy. "No more such hypotheses
were to be permitted in Italy or anywhere else under Rome's authority. It was in the north,
where the Roman writ ran less effectively, that the work continued, thanks to one of Galileo's
German contemporaries [Kepler] .... " JAMms BURKE, THE DAY THE UNIVERSE CHANGED 149
(1985).
76. See JAcoB BRoNOwsri, THE ASCENT OF MAN 214 (1973); GIOROO DE SANTILLANA,
THE Caum OF GALILEO (1955). In addition to forcing Galileo to recant his assertion that the
earth revolved around the sun, the Pope placed his book, The Dialogue on the Two Chief
Systems of the World, on the Index of Prohibited Books, where it remained until 1835. BuRCE,
supra note 75, at 149.
77. See BURKE, supra note 75, at 149.
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a plausible reason to oppose fetal tissue transplants on ethical grounds.
B. Even Those Who Believe Abortion to Be a Wrongful Act Should Be
Willing to Benefit from Abortions They Cannot Stop
In the eyes of some, it is wrong to accept a benefit from a wrongful
act. 78 Many of those who oppose abortion feel that abortion is murder. It
is said that to accept a benefit from abortions is to endorse and perhaps
even become a participant in murder.
Such a view is entirely unreasonable. Accepting arguendo that abortion
should be considered murder, let us consider and compare the obviously
analogous case of an organ transplant from a deceased adult who was
murdered. 79 Hypothetically, then, assume that I am in need of a heart
transplant and I will die soon if no heart is found. Some amoral thug,
intent on robbery, hits John Doe over the head with a pipe and robs him.
The blow proves fatal and John Doe is pronounced dead on arrival at a
nearby hospital. His family is willing to donate his heart. If I save my life
by accepting the heart, am I praising murder?
The missing link is causation. We all agree that "[a] wrongdoer shall
not be permitted to profit through his own wrongdoing." 80 But the wrong-
doer was the robber, and he had killed John Doe whether I accept the
heart or not.8 ' I have, if anything, undone some of the murderer's evil act
by finding some good in the sadness.
One other analogy needs to be considered and distinguished. While
vegetarians refuse meat for many reasons, at least some do so to resist the
killing of animals. Because, by the time meat is in the grocery store the
animal has long since been killed, our previous argument might be taken
as showing the illogic of the vegetarian. To a degree, this is true, but not
for the most part. Because the amount of meat sold in the grocery store
today dictates how much will be ordered, and therefore killed, for tomorrow,
refusing to buy meat today will cause fewer animals to be killed in the
future. However, because family planning and not the demand for fetal
tissue dictates the number of abortions, the vegetarian's reasoning has no
application. Refusal to accept fetal tissue will not alter the number of
abortions, past, present or future.
78. See, e.g., James T. Burtchaell, Case Study: University Policy on Experimental Use
of Aborted Fetal Tissue, IRB: A REvisw OF Hui UN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, July-Aug. 1988, at
7; Robertson, supra note 3, at 449-53.
79. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 451.
80. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 151
(1968) (Marshall, J., concurring).
81. Taking this philosophy to its logical extreme, Professor Robertson argues that we
should feel no compulsion about making positive use of the data generated by Nazi doctors
while they were engaged in horrendous experiments on humans. Robertson, supra note 3, at
452-53; see also L. TuSHNET, THE VisEs OF ADVERSrrY: STUDIES OF STARVATION IN THE WARSAW
GHETTO (1966). Robertson concedes that the point is controversial, citing contrary conclusions.
Robertson, supra note 3, at 452 n.34.
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C. Respect for the Integrity of the Bodies of Deceased Persons Does
Not Require Foregoing the Use of Fetal Tissue
Those opposed to abortion may argue that fetuses are, themselves,
persons.82 Thus, their bodies are entitled to the respect and dignity ordinarily
paid to the bodies of the dead. This would, it is assumed, include prohibition
of mutilation of those dead bodies. Yet, it also must be admitted that, with
the prior consent of the deceased, or of relatives after death,83 the bodies
of deceased adults and children are damaged to the degree necessary to
remove organs for transplants. Society values saving the lives of the living
above the absolute dignity of the dead body. Further, state laws requiring
embalming or other health and safety measures84 and state autopsy laws85
routinely overrule the decedent's or his family's wishes 6 as to bodily integrity
82. Determination of the precise point of onset of personhood is inherently problematic.
The moment of birth is a logical stopping point on the slippery slope. The point of viability,
emphasized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is less obvious and logical, but it has, for
the moment, the force of law. Since viability means the time when the fetus can survive
outside the womb with artificial assistance, technological progress will, obviously, move this
date closer and closer to the date of conception, making Roe's reliance on viability Roe's
undoing.
Recently, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), Justice Blackmun
defended his opinion in Roe. In particular, he asserted that the threshold of fetal viability
remains the same today as it was when Roe was decided. Id. at 554 n.9. Incredibly, he even
predicted that no medical progress would ever occur in the future, saying, "[p]redictions to
the contrary are pure science fiction." Id. But see Nancy K. Rhoden, The New Neonatal
Dilemma: Live Births From Late Abortions, 72 GEo. L.J. 1451, 1461-62 (1984).
The moment of conception, the uniting of sperm and egg, is an equally logical, or more
logical, time to which to assign personhood. Roe selected viability because of its legal
consequences, rather than its logical consequences. Indeed, some argue that personhood, or
something like it, should attach to the separate sperm and egg, thereby justifying opposition
to contraception. See Letter from C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General, to President Ronald
Reagan (Jan. 9, 1989) (reprinted in Medical and Psychological Impact of Abortion: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 68-69 (1989) [hereinafter Abortion
Hearings] (noting that some in pro-life camp equate contraception with abortion). Curiously,
this same logic would make those who abstain from constant and promiscuous sex into
murderers.
83. See infra notes 138-70 and accompanying text. The 1987 revision of the UAGA
reflects a significant trend toward disregarding the need for the consent of the decedent or his
family in favor of presumed donation. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
84. Indeed, one insightful author has pointed out,
Many violations [of the corpse] occur, for example, in preparing the body for burial;
arteries are cut, blood is removed, and formaldehyde is pumped into the vessels.
Similarly, eyelids may be sewn closed, and faces may be restored. Practices such as
these are accepted largely because people do not think about them; they are performed
behind the closed doors of the undertaking establishment.
Steven M. Cooper, Consent and Organ Donation, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 559,
581 (1985).
85. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1238 (1992).
86. Some have argued that the decedent's wishes or his family's wishes should be
routinely overruled in order to allow cadaveric transplants, because saving lives is the highest
social value. See Cooper, supra note 84, at 570; Silver, supra note 20, at 681; see also supra
note 20 and infra notes 164-69.
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for what are perceived to be important societal purposes. Indeed, even
simple economic concerns, such as protecting employers, insurance com-
panies and defendants from liability, have been held sufficient to justify an
autopsy over the objections of the decedent or his family 7 when, for
example, evidence may be obtained for civil litigation. If these economic
concerns are sufficient to override the dignity of nonfetal cadavers, urging
greater protection for fetuses is likely a subconscious and irrational attempt
to strike out at abortion.
Requiring that no tissue or organs be taken from fetuses will not end
abortion or restore the fetus to life. Fetal transplants will no more mutilate
or deface the corpse of a fetus than adult cadaveric transplants and autopsies
do.
D. Respect for Human Life Is Better Served by Saving Lives Through
Fetal Tissue Transplants
Those who oppose abortion assert that they do so out of respect for
human life. 88 Yet the sanctity of life cuts two ways in the fetal tissue
transplant debate. It is difficult to believe that anyone who feels so strongly
about saving human life could willingly ignore the lives that fetal tissue
research could save. Depending on the degree of success achieved by fetal
tissue transplant techniques, 9 it is possible that more lives could be saved
every year than are abortedP9 Additionally, because abortions will occur
anyway, opposition to fetal tissue research is difficult to justify.
It must also be noted that success with fetal tissue transplants may-
rather than increasing the number of abortions-actually decrease the num-
ber of abortions. Most abortions are for family planning purposes, but a
number of abortions are performed every year to terminate pregnancies in
which the fetus is known to be damaged or defective. 9' To the extent that
87. See Cooper, supra note 84, at 580-81.
88. But see infra note 92 and accompanying text (giving alternate explanation for anti-
abortion attitudes). Since saving lives may not be the reason for opposing abortion, the
countervailing saving of lives by fetal transplants also may be irrelevant.
89. For example, treatment of AIDS is a fair probability. The worldwide epidemic which
could thereby be prevented could otherwise exceed the absolute and relative damage of the
Bubonic Plague of the fourteenth century which, in two decades, killed half the population
of Europe. See BURKE, supra note 75, at 55-57. The plague ultimately was overcome by a
coincidence of nature in the form of one competing type of rat (brown) overtaking and
destroying the population of another (black). Only the latter type carried and spread the
plague. Id. at 164. Such an easy end to the AIDS crisis is inherently improbable.
90. This greater numbers analysis cannot be taken too far, however. See supra note 60
(critiquing Professor Robertson's similar analysis in another context). Taken literally, the
argument could be used to kill healthy adults for their organs. The death of one adult could
save several lives because the various organs would not all be needed by one patient.
Nonetheless, the saving of lives is an offsetting factor against the harm of abortion, even if
we refuse to quantify it so simplistically.
91. See, e.g., Skerrett, supra note 6, at 82 (fetal tissue shows promise in treating congenital
deformities and effects of maternally ingested drugs).
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some of these defects can be cured, before or after birth, by fetal tissue
transplants, some parents who want to have a baby would then be able to
cure the defect and not abort. In the final balance, those who feel that life
is a sacred right should, at least as long as they are unable to eliminate
elective abortions entirely, be the strongest supporters of fetal tissue research.
It is also possible that those who oppose abortion do so out of a desire
to punish or deter premarital sex. Especially in the case of those who are
opposed to abortion and yet in favor of the death penalty-a surprisingly
common combination-a preoccupation with sex is a more plausible expla-
nation than a concern for the absolute sanctity of life. Further, those who
truly wish to reduce abortions could do so far more effectively by improving
sex education, instead of opposing it, and by increasing access to contra-
ception.Y Pro-choice commentators too often concede the moral high ground
to anti-abortionists simply because the anti-abortionists claim to act in the
name of the "right to life."
IV. Ti LAW REGULATING FETAL TIssUE RESEARCH
A. Constitutional Principles
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court held that a woman
has a fundamental right of privacy in deciding whether to terminate a
pregnancy. 93 Although the woman's right to terminate a pregnancy is
fundamental, the state may regulate or even proscribe abortion when the
state acquires a compelling interest. To determine the point when the state's
interest becomes compelling and to what extent a state may regulate abor-
tion, the Court adopted a trimester analysis.9 Within the first trimester a
woman may abort for any reason.95 In the second trimester the state acquires
a compelling interest in maternal health and may regulate abortion.9 This
is because abortion procedures after the first trimester pose more risk to
the mother than those used during the first trimesterY Finally, in the third
trimester the state may protect the lifeof the fetus, itself, due to its degree
of development. 98
Roe's constitutional right to an abortion, however, does not limit the
"state's authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abor-
92. See Burlingame, supra note 6, at 238-39.
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). Notably, other nations have widely
accepted the concept of reproductive privacy or autonomy as a basic human right. See, e.g.,
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 12; see also Morgentaler v. The Queen, I S.C.R. 30 (1988) (Canadian
Supreme Court follows Roe in striking down anti-abortion statute).
94. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56, 163-65.
95. Id. at 163-64.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 165. But see supra note 82 (criticizing third trimester aspect of Roe).
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tion." 9  In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,' °° the Court upheld a
state statute requiring viability testing on fetuses gestated twenty or more
weeks prior to performing an abortion. 101 Although the Court sent clear
signals that it may soon reject Roe's trimester approach to the constitutional
right of abortion, 10 2 the Court did not suggest an alternative to viability as
the test for determining when a state acquires the compelling interest needed
in order to regulate abortion. 03
Because courts are more likely to uphold regulations protecting human
fetal rights after Webster, the technology of fetal tissue transplantation may
be subject to greater regulation but not prohibited entirely. 104 There currently
are no significant legal barriers to the use of fetal tissue. 0 5 Thus, the use
of first trimester tissue from aborted fetuses should not pose a problem
unless Roe is overruled outright.
Rumors of the impending death of Roe keep proving premature. In
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,'06 the pro-life members
of the Court only achieved a decision that permitted the states to require,
if they choose, clear and convincing evidence of the patient's actual wishes
before terminating medical treatment based on the patient's wishes.10 7 In so
99. Hess-Mahan, supra note 11, at 811.
100. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
101. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
102. Id. at 518-19. Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy and White criticized the trimester ap-
proach. Id. at 518. Justice Rehnquist thought "the Roe trimester framework should be
abandoned" because he saw no reason why the State's compelling interest in protecting
potential life should not extend throughout the pregnancy rather than coming into existence
only at the point of viability. Id. at 518-19. Justice Scalia, concurring, favored overruling Roe
outright. Id. at 532; see also infra note Ill.
103. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519. In Webster, the Court narrowly interpreted Roe v. Wade
and upheld a Missouri statute that imposed significant restrictions on the right of a pregnant
woman to obtain an abortion. Id. at 522. With regard to the fetal viability testing provision
at issue in the Missouri statute, the Court endorsed the use of fetal viability as the point when
the state acquires a compelling interest to regulate abortion. Id. at 518-21.
104. Frankowska, supra note 25, at 1103. The question of "just what is fundamental is
undercut by recent restrictive interpretations of Roe v. Wade and by the possibility of its being
narrowed or overturned in the imminent future." Stephen C. Hicks, Law, Policy and Person-
hood In The Context of the Techniques of Human Experimentation in Modern Medicine, 19
CAP. U. L. REv. 255, 276 (1990).
105. But see infra notes 203-15 and accompanying text (state statutes restricting use of
fetal tissue are most likely unconstitutional on equal protection or due process grounds).
106. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
107. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Cruzan was even
less of a victory for the pro-life faction, because it is unclear whether the Court really affirmed
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to keep Nancy Cruzan alive. In order to so hold, ihe
Missouri Supreme Court had to reach two separate anti-euthanasia holdings. First, the court
had to hold that clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's actual wishes was required
before she could be euthanatized based on her own wishes. This the court held, and found
that the evidence before the trial court was not clear and convincing. Id. at 285-87. Second,
the court held that no substituted judgment could be made for Nancy Cruzan. Id. at 286.
Otherwise the family could have received the requested authority on that basis. Id. Curiously,
the United States Supreme Court's decision was a four to four decision, with Justice O'Connor
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doing, the Court conceded a liberty interest in personal medical choices, 08
and Roe, itself, was left, astonishingly, unmentioned in the decision. Finally,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'09 while approving of conditions such as
waiting periods and parental notification by minors seeking abortions, if a
state chooses to impose them,"0 hardly destroyed Roe"' and will not alter
the supply of fetal tissue."
2
At least one distinguished scholar was not surprised by Roe's continuing
vitality."' Arguing that the law reacts to realities that are the product of
social trends, Professor Larry Barnett sees societal needs and values as the
basis for the occurrence and outcome of the Court's decisions." 4 Court
casting the swing vote in what was called a "concurrence." Id. at 263-64. She did join the
plurality in upholding Missouri's right to require clear and convincing evidence for the
effectuation of Nancy Cruzan's actual wishes. Id. at 282. However, Justice O'Connor then
stressed, inaccurately, that the Court was not deciding whether Nancy Cruzan's federal
constitutional privacy right required Missouri to appoint her family to make a substituted
judgment for her. Id. By way of what she thought was dicta, Justice O'Connor opined that
Nancy's privacy rights probably included such a right. Id. at 287-88. Thus, Justice O'Connor
should have voted, on that latter basis alone, to join by concurrence with the four dissenting
votes, who would then be the new plurality, in reversing the Missouri Supreme Court. Therefore,
it appears that the wrong party was identified by the Court itself as having won the Cruzan
decision.
108. Id. at 278.
109. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see Anita L. Allen, Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 683 (1992); Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent,
and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 68 NOTE DAME L. Rav. 11 (1992).
110. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992). This is a common point
in all of the cases in which states are trying to chip away at Roe and even the attempt to
overrule Roe itself. All that can logically be hoped for is to permit states to undermine Roe;
not to require them to do so. Social changes which have taken place in this country would
not permit the Court to go farther, and will not result in all 50 states making abortion legal
if the Court overrules Roe. See LARRY D. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, SOCIAL CONCEPT: A
MACROSOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTrW ON LAW (1993) [hereinafter BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT];
LARRY D. BARNETr, POPULATION, POLICY, AND THE UNrrED STATES CONSTITUTION 156-59 (1982)
[hereinafter BARNETT, POPULATION].
111. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855, 2859-66, 2873-85. There were, of course, four votes in
Casey for overruling Roe outright.
112. See supra notes 53, 72 and accompanying text (excess of tissue currently available).
113. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 110; BARNETr, POPULATION, supra note
110, at 161; see also LARRY D. BARNETT & EmLY F. REED, LAW, SocIaTY, AND POPULATION:
ISSUES IN A NEw FIELD (1985).
114. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 110; BARNETT, POPULATION, supra note
110, at 161 (discussing interrelationship of demographic trends and constitutional trends).
Professor Barnett's position is clearly illustrated by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992). In that case, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter took the extraordinary
step of writing a joint opinion, presumably to enhance the opinion's legitimacy. Id. at 2803-
33. The opinion explicitly concedes that overruling Roe in the existing sociopolitical context
would destroy the Court's legitimacy. Id. at 2814-16. Thus, while allowing state restrictions,
the Court explicitly, albeit quite reluctanty, re-affirmed Roe in what can only be described as
yielding to public attitudes that the majority of the Court did not share. To create a majority,
Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe, concurred separately. Blackmun's
concurrence even noted that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy previously had seemed about to
overrule Roe. Id. at 2844.
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cases dealing with the constitutionality of government action generally are
not accepted for review by the Court unless the Court feels that American
society is prepared to accept the decision the Court is likely to render."'
Indeed, the public fear that the Court might overrule Roe undoubtedly
played a significant role in the recent presidential election, with a resulting
shift in the likely orientation of potential future justices.
116
Even if Roe should be overruled, this would only mean that the states
may-but do not have to-make abortion illegal. Notably, New York had
legalized abortion by statute shortly before the Roe decision., 7 The likeli-
hood that more than a fraction of the states would utterly prohibit abortions,
if the Court overruled Roe, is minute or nonexistent. Thus, it must be
accepted even by those opposed to abortion that abortion will remain legal.
There may continue to be restrictions which will not greatly reduce the
number of abortions, and it is barely possible that some states may make
abortion entirely illegal, but more than enough elective, family planning
abortions to oversupply the need for fetal tissue will continue to take place.
B. Federal Regulation of Fetal Tissue Research
Fetal tissue use is regulated by laws concerning fetal research as well
as laws governing organ and tissue donations. The laws regarding fetal
tissue research were enacted primarily due to concerns about exploitation
and commercialization of fetuses expected to be available following the Roe
v. Wade decision legalizing abortion during the first two trimesters of
pregnancy. 118 The laws that regulate organ and tissue donation, as well as
115. BARNETr & REED, supra note 113, at xiii-iv.
116. For example, it is widely known to be possible that Mr. Justice Blackmun, the elderly
author of the Roe v. Wade decision, will retire in the next presidential term. There are four
votes already on the Court in favor of overruling Roe, outright. See supra note 111. The
replacement of Blackmun with a vastly more conservative justice that President Bush would
likely have nominated, might have meant the temporary end of Roe. The election of Clinton
forecloses this possibility, as lie has already made clear. See Thomas Friedman, Aides Say
Clinton Will Swiftly Void G.O.P. Initiative, N.Y. TmtAs, Nov. 6, 1992, at Al.
117. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147 n.41 (1973).
118. See Mahowald et al., supra note 29, at 11 (noting that Congress passed moratorium
on fetal research one year after Roe v. Wade). Fetal tissue research is not a novelty. Research
using animal tissue began early in the 1900s. Ryan, supra note 53, at 683. Animal tissue
research was soon followed by research on treatments using tissue from recently deceased adult
cadavers. Id. at 684. During the 1930s these developments led to the first fetal tissue research
and, as an example, the 1954 Nobel Prize For Medicine was awarded to researchers who
developed part of the material needed for the polio vaccine from cell lines of human fetal
kidney cells. Burlingame, supra note 6, at 223.
Federal funding was being used to finance fetal tissue research for decades before Roe
v. Wade, without attracting much attention. Hess-Mahan, supra note 11, at 801. Just prior
to Roe, an unrelated controversy broke over reports of abuse of live aborted fetuses by
Scandinavian researchers. Id. A National Institute of Child Health and Development exami-
nation of the issue uncovered instances of abuse of live fetuses in the United States. For
example, in March 1972, the public learned that a hospital in Pittsburgh packed aborted fetuses
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fetal research laws, were enacted before the technology of fetal tissue
transplants became medically feasible." 9
Currently, fetal tissue use is regulated at both the federal and state level
by an assortment of laws. At the federal level, regulations cover only
research funded through the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS).' ° However, the Bush administration, in November of 1989, in-
definitely extended a 1974 congressional ban on federal financing of research
using fetal tissue.12' More recently, Congress attempted to overcome that
rule, but was met with a veto by President Bush.'2 Finally, with President
Bush's defeat in the 1992 election, the new administration ended the
moratorium.'2 Although the federal moratorium was oftei spoken of as
prohibiting fetal research, it must be emphasized that the moratorium only
prohibited federally funded research. Those who favor the research have
fallen astoundingly short in not seeking state and private foundation funds.
Notwithstanding the recent moratorium, and perhaps because it was
originally intended to be temporary, the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
published guidelines applicable to research conducted or funded by the
DHHS.124 These guidelines recommended federal support of certain cate-
gories of fetal research, conditioned on the approval of local institutional
review boards, the informed consent of the mother, and the nonobjection
of the father.' 25 These research regulations will, now that the moratorium
is over, govern federally funded fetal tissue transplants.1
26
in ice for shipment to laboratories while they still showed signs of movement and, in 1973,
that an experiment at Yale Medical School involved dissecting a living male fetus without
anesthesia. Bregman, supra note 40, at 1175. Consequently, in 1973 The National Institutes
of Health (N.I.H.) declared a temporary moratorium on all federally funded research on live
fetuses, intending only to delay such research until rules to avoid abuse could be promulgated.
Hess-Mahan, supra note 11, at 801. While such rules were under consideration, Roe was
decided, and the controversy took on an entirely new dimension and magnitude.
119. Mahowald et al., supra note 29, at 11. Notably, the UAGA was initially promulgated
in 1968, prior even to the pre-Roe fetal abuse controversy. See supra note 118. The 1987
revision was enacted well after Roe, but during the Reagan-Bush moratorium, so fetal
transplants were not a significant issue. Most of the UAGA's revisions were directed toward
increasing the supply of organs from adult cadavers by disregarding the lack of consent of
the decedent or his family. See infra notes 164-69.
120. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
121. Mahowald et al., supra note 29, at 11; Frankowska, supra note 25, at 1096; Sarkos,
supra note 41, at 407-08; Jacquelyn F. Sedlak, Note, Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Regulating
the Medical Hope for the Future, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 57, 65 (1989-90).
122. Maria Puente, Bush's Perfect Veto Record Preserved, U.S.A. TODAY, June 25, 1992,
at 4A; see also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 11 (noting that Clinton administration has lifted ban on federal
funding of fetal tissue research).
124. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION oF HumAN SUJEcTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETUs, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1975); see
also supra note 118.
125. See NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJEcTs OF BIOMEDICAL AND
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In 1975 the DHHS adopted a set of regulations and Congress subse-
quently enacted two statutes concerning different aspects of federally funded
fetal research. 27 The DHHS regulations apply to research on fetuses in and
ex utero.'2 However, before any activity covered in the DHHS regulations
can be commenced, a physician not involved in the research must determine
whether the fetus is viable.129 Obviously, the removal of organs that would
end the life of the fetus can only be done to dead or nonviable fetuses. a0
For purposes of this Article, it is important to understand the difference
between a viable, a nonviable, and a dead fetus. A viable fetus is a fetus
that is "able, after either spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given
the benefit of available medical therapy) to the point of independently
maintaining heartbeat and respiration."'' A nonviable fetus is a fetus "ex
utero which, although living, is not viable."" 2 A dead fetus is a fetus "ex
utero which exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activity,
spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical
cords (if still attached)."'
3
The DHHS regulations modestly limit the activities that may be carried
out on a nonviable fetus ex utero."4 First, to avoid any manipulation of
the abortion procedure, the DHHS regulations set up what is often called
a "Chinese wall" between the individuals engaged in the abortion procedure
and the individuals engaged in fetal research." 5 Second, both parents must
BEHAVioRAL RESEARCH, supra note 124, at 61-88. No specific provision exists, however, for
notifying the father. See also infra note 150 and accompanying text.
126. Danis, supra note 15, at 1086. "Undoubtedly, the inadequacies of these guidelines
as applied to fetal-tissue transplants influenced the decision to effect a temporary ban." Id.
at 1087.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1990) (National Organ Transplant Act) (amended by Organ
Transplants Amendment Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 3114 (1990)) (prohibiting transfer of any fetal
tissue or organs in interstate commerce for valuable consideration); 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a) (West
Supp. 1990) (Health Research Extension Act of 1985) (prohibiting Secretary of Health and
Human Services from supporting any research involving live fetuses for whom viability has
not been determined); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1992) (DHHS regulations).
128. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1992); see also Frankowska, supra note 25, at 1005.
129. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(a) (1992).
130. Id. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), permits the states to treat the fetus as a
person after viability. Thus, killing a viable fetus would appear to be homicide under state
law, and the removal of organs for transplant when death would not occur would be governed
by state law on substituted consent. See infra note 143.
131. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1992).
132. Id. § 46.203(e).
133. Id. § 46.203(f).
134. Section 46.209(b) provides in pertinent part that a nonviable ex utero fetus cannot
be the subject of a research activity unless: (1) "[v]ital functions of the fetus will not be
artificially maintained," (2) "[e]xperimental activities which of themselves would terminate the
heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will not be employed," and (3) the purpose is "the
development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means."
Id. § 46.209(b).
135. Id. § 46.206(a)(3) ("Individuals engaged in [fetal research] will have no part in: (i)
[any decision as to the timing, method, and procedure used to terminate the pregnancy .... ).
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be legally competent and give their informed consent before research may
be done on the fetus, unless the father cannot be located. 36 And finally,
the regulations require that research involving dead fetuses, fetal tissue, or
fetal cells must comply with applicable state or local laws relating to fetal
research. 37
C. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
State laws applicable to fetal research apply whether or not the research
is federally funded. The UAGA of 1968, or the 1987 revision of it, regulates
tissue and organ donations in all fifty states. 38 Designed to encourage
anatomical gifts within and among states, the UAGA provides a number
of guidelines that an individual tan follow to effectuate an organ donation. 39
However, because the original UAGA was promulgated before the technol-
ogy of fetal tissue transplantation became medically feasible and the 1987
version was enacted during the federal moratorium, strict application of the
UAGA gives rise to unique issues when applied to organ donation from
electively aborted fetuses. This section will focus on the provisions of the
UAGA and how the UAGA can be applied effectively to fetal tissue
transplants.
The UAGA governs tissue donation for therapeutic and research pur-
poses from all dead humans, including dead fetuses."4' Although a great
number of authors have assumed that the UAGA, in either its 1968 or 1987
version, is applicable to all fetal tissue transplants, a minor problem is
presented because some fetal tissue is taken from fetuses which, while
nonviable, are not dead.' 4' The UAGA does not apply to tissue donations
from live persons, such as blood donations, skin donations, bone marrow,
or kidney donations, 42 so there may be no applicable law for fetal donations
in such cases. 43 The UAGA is probably best applied by analogy until an
amendment can resolve this point.
136. Id. §§ 46.208(b) (in utero), 209(d) (ex utero). For the purposes of the regulations,
informed consent is defined at 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1992).
137. Id. § 46.210.
138. UNT. ANATOMICAL Girr ACT §§ 1-11 (1968); UAGA §§ 1-17 (1987). The 1968 version
was adopted in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. See 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (1983)
(providing table of jurisdictions where 1968 Act was adopted). The 1987 version has been
enacted in 14 jurisdictions in place of the original. See 8A U.L.A. 3 (Supp. 1992) (providing
table of jurisdictions where 1987 Act has been adopted).
139. Danis, supra note 15, at 1088-89.
140. See UAGA § 1(2) (1987) ("decedent" includes fetus).
141. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142. See 8A U.L.A. 16 (1983) (providing that all that is needed for transplantation is
informed consent).
143. Cf. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990); Head v. Colloton,
331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); Little v. Little,
576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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Under the UAGA an anatomical gift may be made by the donor
himself. 44 This provision obviously was intended for and is restricted to,
adult donors who may make provision for donation to take place upon
their death.' 4 Thus, the provision has no bearing on fetuses. If the donor
has made no provision, the decisional authority passes to the next of kin.
The next of kin are given priority under a hierarchy that effectively gives
the fetus' parents the highest priority.'"6
Because the UAGA is not oriented to the context of elective abortions,
it assumes that both parents will be known and equally available. 47 If one
parent objects to the donation, that parent may block the other from
donating the fetal tissue. 41 Section 2(b) provides that a person in the highest
priority class available may make a gift "in the absence of actual notice of
... opposition by a member of the same ... class.' 1 49 Therefore, if either
parent is opposed to the donation, that parent may prevent the other from
donating the fetal tissue. Alternatively stated, the consent of one parent
and the nonobjection or nonnotification of the other is needed to effectuate
donation of fetal tissue. Although the father, can hardly be expected to state
his views if he is not notified, there does not appear to be any notification
requirement in the UAGA. As a result, the practice is that the aborting
mother makes the decision.5 0
Since 1987 the UAGA has required informed consent to effectuate an
anatomical gift.' 5' Informed consent is derived from the permission of either
144. UAGA § 2(a) (1968); UAGA § 2(a) (1987).
145. See supra note 144. The UAGA defines an adult as a person "at least [18] years of
age." See UAGA § 2(a) (1987). The use of brackets in the original is intended to suggest that
states may vary this term. Nevada, for example, permits children Who are 12 or older to make
donations. See 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (Supp. 1992) (noting variations from official text of UAGA).
146. UAGA § 3(a) (1987) (similar list in UAGA § 2(b) (1968)) provides the following
priority:
(1) the spouse of the decedent;
(2) an adult son or daughter of the decedent;
(3) either parent of the decedent;
(4) an adult brother or sister of the decedents;
(5) a grandparent of the decedent; and
(6) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of death.
Obviously, a fetus will have neither a spouse nor any adult children. Therefore, for fetal
donations, the hierarchy begins with (3) and continues down the list in the highly unlikely
case that the mother is not able to give her consent. The mother might, for example, be
incompetent because she might be retarded or she may be unconscious due to an injury. In
such cases, assuming that the father is unknown or cannot be located, responsibility would
pass to the mother's adult children, if any, and then to the mother's parents.
147. UAGA § 2(b) (1968) ("either parent") (emphasis added); see also UAGA § 3(a)(3)
(1987).
148. UAGA § 2(b) (1968); UAGA § 3(b)(3) (1987).
149. UAGA § 2(b) (1968).
150. Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
27-28 (1988) (insertion from National Institutes of Health, Report of the Human Fetal Tissue
Transplantation Research Panel, Vol. 1, Dec. 1988).
151. UAGA § 5 (1987).
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the person whose tissue is to be transplanted prior to his death or from the
decedent's next of kin. Because the fetus is incapable of giving consent and
the UAGA treats the fetus as a decedent,5 2 the parents' informed consent
will always be at issue in fetal tissue transplantation.'
One problem in applying the UAGA to fetal tissue transplants is that
the Act allows a donor or vicarious decisionmaker to specify the recipient.
54
This specification must be followed unless the specified recipient is no longer
alive, available, willing to receive, or in need of the donation.' Because
there is no danger of homicides or suicides occurring for the purpose of
making organs available, this provision makes sense. Also, for blood rela-
tives, tissue rejection can be minimized. Yet, in the context of fetal tissue
neither reason applies. In view of the fear that women will have abortions
for the purpose of making tissue available to a specific relative, the UAGA
should be amended to prohibit specifying the recipient of fetal tissue.
56
Section 7(b) of the 1968 UAGA, and section 8(b) of the 1987 UAGA
create a "Chinese wall" separating the doctors treating the patient from
the doctors involved in the donation. The 1968 Act provides, "[tihe phy-
sician [determining death] shall not participate in the procedures for re-
moving or transplanting a [body] part."'' 17 The 1987 Act improves this
provision, stating that "[n]either the physician or surgeon who attends the
donor at death nor the physician or surgeon who determines the time of
death may participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a
[body] part unless the document of gift designates a particular physician
[to do so].158 Both of these provisions obviously speak to adult cadaveric
donations, but they fit the fetal context fairly well. The 1968 version,
however, does not create a firm "Chinese wall," because the physician
determining the death' 59 might not be the physician advising or performing
the abortion. Thus, the latter physician, if not the one who determines fetal
death, still may be involved in the use of the fetal tissue. The 1987 Act
cures this defect, but the added exception for a "designated" physician
152. UAGA § l(b) (1968); UAGA § 1(2) (1987).
153. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing UAGA's next of kin hierarchy).
154. UAGA § 3(4) (1968); UAGA § 6(3) (1987).
155. UAGA § 7(a) (1968); UAGA § 8(a) (1987).
156. The fear of women having abortions in order to make tissue available is irrational.
See supra notes 62, 22 and accompanying text. However, nothing is lost by including a
restriction against specifying the recipient, because fetal tissue matching is unnecessary.
157. UAGA § 7(B) (1968).
158. UAGA § 8(b) (1987). Notably, both versions of the Act allow the donor to designate
the physician to remove the organs or the physician to receive the organs. In the 1968 Act,
this authority is simply inconsistent with § 7(b), and the inconsistency remains unresolved.
The 1987 Act resolves the inconsistency, but, arguably, the wrong way, making the Chinese
wall protection give way.
159. Actually, in the case of a fetus, the physician would be determining the nonviability
of the fetus, rather than its death. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text; see also
Bauer, supra note 55, at 25-26. This is another minor example of the UAGA's not being
designed to deal with the peculiar aspects of fetal tissue donation. The problem is not serious
because most fetuses are aborted early and by evacuation, which kills the fetus.
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unfortunately allows the aborting mother to, by designating the physician
performing the abortion, determining fetal death, or both, waive the "Chi-
nese wall." As applied to fetal tissue, therefore, both Acts need revision.
The original UAGA, promulated in 1968, was adopted, with some
variations,' 60 in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.16' In 1987 a
revised, drastically changed UAGA was promulgated. 62 Fourteen states have
since adopted the revised UAGA.' 63 Two provisions of the 1987 Act, not
found in the 1968 Act, are of relevance to fetal tissue transplants.
Section 4, perhaps the centerpiece of the new Act, allows medical
personnel to proceed with the donation of organs from a cadaver in the
absence of knowledge of an objection by the decedent or the next of kin.1
64
This has the effect of presuming an intent to donate, rather than permitting
and facilitating its expression as the 1968 Act did. To verify the absence of
a known objection by the decedent, medical personnel must make a rea-
sonable effort to check the decedent's medical records 16 and to verify a
lack of objection by next of kin, medical personnel should make a reasonable
effort to notify them. 166 However, these two efforts need only be reasonable,
"taking into account the useful life of the [body] part."' 67 This means that
in many cases no one will be notified and no medical records will be
checked. 68 The wisdom and constitutionality of presuming the improbable
and employing a procedure which may make that presumption irrebuttable 69
is beyond the scope of this Article. This provision clearly is not applicable
in the case of elective abortions when no excuse is available for not
160. For example, the California Act makes special provision for negating the power of
relatives to make donations on behalf of any decedent who was a member of a religious sect
opposed to anatomical gifts. 8A U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1992) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7152 (West Supp. 1993)).
161. See 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (1983) (providing table of jurisdictions that adopted 1968 Act).
162. 8A U.L.A. 3-32 (Supp. 1992).
163. Id. at 3 (providing table of jurisdictions that have adopted 1987 Act).
164. UAGA § 4 (1987).
165. Id. § 4(a)(2).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. As the official comment to section 4, euphemistically speaking in terms of "balance,"
lamely admits,
Subsection (a)(2) seeks to balance societal and family interests, that is, to increase
the size of the donor pool and to give the family the opportunity to make or refuse
to make an anatomical gift. The balance in this subsection is on the side of increasing
the size of the donor pool .... If removal must be immediate and there is no
medical or other record and no [relative] is present, the requirement of subsection
(a)(2) is satisfied.
UAGA § 4 cmt. (1987).
169. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). See generally Erik
S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Daviss] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 CoLtrm. L. REv. 528 (1990).
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consulting the mother prior to the abortion. The "rush" associated with,
for example, traffic accident victims or crime victims would not be involved
in elective abortions.
Finally, a notable addition found only in the 1987 Act and worthy of
adoption in all fifty states, including those reluctant to adopt all of the new
Act, is section 10. Section 10 prohibits the sale or purchase of body parts.
170
The Act makes the sale or purchase of body parts a felony. This prohibition
is a welcome addition in the area of fetal transplants, and it is surprising
that no such prohibition was included in the 1968 Act.
V. ALLOCATING DEcIsIoNAL AUTHORITY
A. The Mother
The UAGA's provision placing decisional authority with both parents
has proven unworkable in the context of the donation of fetal tissue. Its
practical effect-placing decisional authority solely with the aborting mother-
has produced considerable criticism. Yet, no preferable alternative has been
proposed.
While the fetus is still within the womb, the proper locus of decisional
authority is clear. Because the pregnant woman's bodily interests are directly
implicated,17' decisional authority regarding the fetus's fate clearly should
rest with the pregnant woman.17 2 In fact, during the first trimester of
pregnancy, Roe v. Wade gives the pregnant woman a fundamental right of
170. UAGA § 10 (1987). Some states had modified the 1968 Act to include a similar
prohibition. See 8A U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1992) (listing, for example, § 4307 of New York Act
and § 24-6-11 of New Mexico Act); see also Robertson, supra note 3, at 474 n.94 (listing 17
states whose statutes prohibit sale of tissue).
Professor Robertson boldly faces the more controversial, issues and defends, if needed as
a source of supply, the ethics of conceiving in order to abort to obtain tissue. See supra note
60. However, Robertson gives the ethical status of paying women to abort to supply tissue
only the suggestion that it "may also be defensible." Robertson, supra note 3, at 474. He,
surprisingly tamely, concludes, "[r]esolution of this difficult issue, however, should await the
actual occurrence of the need to pay to obtain fetal tissue for transplants." Id. at 478.
171. The pregnant woman's bodily interests are directly implicated because "[t]he physical
and functional alterations of pregnancy involve all the body systems, displacing [of] body
parts, depleting the body of its necessary elements and changing its chemical balance ......
Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMMsm 327, 348
(1991) (quoting amici brief for California Committee to Legalize Abortion et al. at 657-59,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18)).
172. Robertson, supra note 60, at 454. Although the father helps to effectuate the
conception of the fetus, the decision of whether or not to bring the fetus to term is inherent
in the mother's right of privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The father's consent
cannot be required and his objection cannot override the mother's decision during the first
trimester. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
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privacy in deciding whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. 17 The best
locus of authority over the disposition of the fetus ex utero is less clear,
however. 174 In cases of spontaneous abortions, it is relatively clear that the
parents retain joint decisional authority over the disposition of the fetus.
17
However, in the case of elective abortions, controversial informal practices
have grown up. In an elective abortion setting, the fetal remains often are
left with the hospital or clinic where the abortion was performed. Although
parents who desire burial or cremation of the fetal remains may request
such disposal if they choose, most parents who electively abort their fetus
wish to leave the experience behind them 176 and the fetal remains typically
are discarded under the state's fetal disposal statute.
Allowing a woman who has decided to abort her fetus to consent to
organ retrieval from the fetus is one of the most problematic areas of fetal
tissue research. 77 The mother's consent to organ retrieval from the dead
fetus is said to be questionable because the mother is the one choosing the
death of the fetus. 17 Those who oppose abortion would condemn the use
of tissue from an aborted fetus because it despoils the corpse of the person
one has intentionally killed. 79 Therefore, one might criticize the salvaging
of fetal tissue on grounds of lack of valid consent.8 0 Thus, while the use
of cadaver tissue is morally acceptable, it is said that the use of fetal tissue
is tainted by the woman's deliberate decision to abort.' 8' However, it may
173. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65. In the event the Supreme Court overrules Roe, some
jurisdictions undoubtedly will continue to have abortions available. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
174. See generally Nicolas Terry, "Alas! Poor Yorick," I Knew Him ex Utero: The
Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United
States, 39 VAD. L. Rav. 419 (1986).
175. Even in such cases Professor Robertson presumably would deny the father any role
because no later obligations on the part of the father would be created. Robertson, supra note
3, at 465 n.66.
176. See Abortion Hearings, supra note 82, at 47 (accompanying testimony of Dr. Jaroslav
Hulka, M.D., Prof. of Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of North Carolina School of
Medicine), 125 (testimony of Psychologist Wanda Franze, Ph.D.), 130-31 (testimony of Nancy
Adler, Ph.D., Prof. of Psychology, University of California-San Francisco).
177. Robertson, supra note 3, at 463.
178. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 104, at 263; see also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text (noting reports of women proposing to become pregnant for purpose of supplying tissue).
179. Jonsen, supra note 8, at 218. The UAGA has no such exception in the case of actual
homicide, undoubtedly because the question never was considered. Thus, the relative of highest
priority could donate organs of a person he had killed. See supra note 146. Professor Robertson
notes in response to this argument, "In an analogous situation, a woman who aborts does
not automatically lose custody of an infant born alive as the result of an abortion procedure
that attempted to kill the fetus .... See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1986),
Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 1979)." Robertson, supra note 3, at 464 n.63.
180. Mary B. Mahowald, Placing Wedges Along a Slippery Slope: Use of Fetal Neural
Tissue for Transplantation, 36 CLINICAL REs. 220, 222 (1988); Burtchaell, supra note 78, at 8.
A plausible alternate decisionmaker never is proposed. The hidden goal of those making this
argument is to stop the research due to the lack of any decisionmaker capable of making the
donation decision.
181. Burtchaell, supra note 78, at 8.
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be argued that the suspect permission of the woman is morally acceptable
because the decision to abort and the abortion procedure are separate from
and not logically related to the disposition of the fetal remains.
8 2
In the well accepted case of cadaveric transplants, tissue procurement
practice in the United States is based upon family consent." 3 Some ethicists,
however, would deny the woman dispositional authority over the fetal
remains on the ground that the woman intentionally aborted her fetus. This
argument assumes that a person who disposes of cadaveric remains acts as
a "guardian" for the deceased. 184 Therefore, a mother who chooses to abort
her fetus is not qualified to act as a guardian of the fetus she previously
aborted because a conflict of interest is said to exist. This argument,
however, is without merit because relatives who acquire the dispositional
authority to consent to tissue and organ donations under the UAGA do
not act as a guardian for the deceased person or fetus.8 5 The family's
traditional right to decide on burial of the deceased is based on assuring
that the remains are treated with respect during burial or cremation.
8 6
Although relatives may honor the prior wishes of the deceased person
concerning disposal of the cadaver, the relatives may violate the expressed
desires of the deceased and instead effectuate the relatives' own decision as
to the type of interment.
8 7
More importantly, the suspect feature of the consent of the woman is
incidental rather than essential to the morality of salvaging cadaver tissue.'
The woman's consent to the abortion procedure is separate from and
unrelated to her consent to the donation of fetal tissue or organs. The so-
called conflict of interest that exists between the fetus and the mother is
over the fetus' life. It is not automatically true, nor is it even probable,
that this conflict continues to exist after the fetus' death. The mother, now
free of the obligation to bear the fetus, no longer has anything to gain at
its expense. The effort to deprive the mother of dispositional control over
the fetus' cadaver may really be one more disguised effort to punish her
for aborting. Also, some would argue that dead bodies, and therefore dead
fetuses, do not have any interest that requires protection; the primary ethical
purpose of consent plays no role wheA dealing with a cadaver. 8 9 Denying
dispositional control of fetal remains to the woman who aborts would lead
to either procuring fetal tissue without parental consent or to a total ban
182. Robertson, supra note 3, at 465.
183. Id. at 466 n.68 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 20, 164-69 and accom-
panying text (arguing that 1987 revision of UAGA is built on specious presumed consent).
184. Robertson, supra note 3, at 464.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 464-65.
187. Id.
188. Jonsen, supra note 8, at 219. For example, many women who lose a fetus to an
undesired miscarriage, as well as many parents who lose a child to a death they did not cause,
are willing to make an anatomical donation. The decision to make such an anatomical donation
is not correlated with abortion.
189. Id. Of the present authors, Professor Gelfand does not endorse this argument.
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on fetal transplants. This goes against the grain of the current tissue
procurement practice of the United States and does nothing to help the
fetus' stature. "Such a radical change in tissue procurement practice is not
necessary to satisfy the need for fetal tissue and would serve only to punish
women who [decide to] abort."'19 As previously demonstrated, the abortion
morality debate must be kept separate and apart from the dispositional
alternatives for fetal remains.
Although not explicitly stated as such, one major reason for allocating
the right and duty to dispose of the deceased body to the next of kin is
the need to allocate that power to someone. High-minded assumptions about
the family following the wishes of the decedent-which have never been
enforced by the law-have never been as important as having someone to
take charge of the cadaver. The father of the aborted fetus aside,' 9' no
other logical decisionmaker is available.
B. The Father
The proper role of the father of the aborted fetus in the decision
whether to donate fetal tissue is highly problematic. Traditional abortion-
related analysis and paternity-related analysis helps little in the novel context
of fetal tissue donation. In an abortion, only the woman's bodily interests
are affected directly. The abortion procedure is a significant and highly
personal intrusion on the woman's body and does not effect the father.1
92
As to paternity-related concerns, the donation of fetal tissue or organs will
not create later obligations in the father. Transplanted fetal tissue or fetal
tissue used in research will never develop to a state of "personhood" leading
to later responsibility for the father. In any event, potential fathers never
have interests in avoiding paternity so great as to allow them to require a
woman to abort. Biology, and therefore law, makes the father a lesser
partner.
However, present law provides theoretical but uneffectuated and im-
practical rights to the father. The UAGA makes the mother's consent
determinative unless the father objects, and then does not provide for notice
to the father. 93 The federal regulations require the father's consent, unless
190. Robertson, supra note 3, at 466; see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
191. In any event, a preference for the father would have to be limited to fathers who
opposed the abortion; otherwise, the same objections would exist. This would be impossible
to police effectively because fathers could easily claim to have opposed the abortion. Since
the father cannot stop the abortion, the genuineness of his opposition could not be known.
In addition to the father, the UAGA provides a hierarchy of lower priority decisionmakers.
See supra note 146. Routine reliance on these lower priority decisionmakers-primarily the
mother's, or the father's, parents would probably create sufficient embarrassment and vexation
to cause aborting mothers to forego donation for reasons plainly unrelated to the donation
question.
192. Although the father may suffer through the emotional aspect of going through an
abortion procedure with the woman who is bearing his child, the father does not experience
the physical intrusion of the abortion procedure itself.
193. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
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he is "unavailable" to consent.'9 These are provisions which are designed
not to be given much effect.
It is at times suggested that the father's authority should be retained,
or even made more effective, when (1) the father was opposed to the
abortion procedure' 95 and, therefore, lacks the supposed conflict of interest,
or (2) the father's religious convictions prohibit the donation of body parts
for research or transplantation. However, administering these two exceptions
to the mother's dispositional authority outside a marriage relationship would
prove to be an administrative nightmare. The mother might be put in the
embarrassing position of being asked questions about which she might have
no knowledge, or might not have any way of finding out the answer.
The relations between women having elective abortions and the fathers
vary from case to case. It may be helpful to think of the possible relation-
ships as being represented by a continuum:
rape-casual-ongoing-live-in-married
Obviously, in the case of rape the woman is unlikely to be willing to have
any discussions with the father. Curiously, although the federal regulations
contain a specific exception from paternal consent in cases of rape,1 96 the
UAGA makes no mention of it. 197 Undoubtedly, this is because the federal
regulations were intended specifically for fetal tissue research, while the
UAGA was drafted before fetal transplants were a significant factor.'9
Casual relationships with unintended pregnancies are undoubtedly the
most common source of elective abortions. In such cases notifying the father
will be difficult for at least four reasons. First, there may be more than
one possible father and the nightmare of identifying the father by testing
will simply cause women to forego donating rather than undergo the testing
process. Second, it may not be possible to locate the father even if his
identity is known. Third, the father may not want to be identified and may
not be willing to cooperate in testing.
Finally, and most importantly, the time delay in such a process will
make the question moot. For reasons of maternal health' 99 and most useful
fetal tissue quality, 2°° the ideal time to abort is in the first trimester. Also,
anti-abortion state regulations may compel an early abortion.20' Given the
time it takes to ascertain that the woman is pregnant and make the decision
194. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(b)(2) (1992).
195. Robertson, supra note 3, at 464 n.61 (discussing Mahowald, supra note 180, and
Burtchaell, supra note 78). The argument is that if the father was willing to take responsibility
of a family and the woman decides to abort, the father should maintain his decisional authority
regarding the fetus's disposition. Id.
196. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(b)(3) (1992).
197. UAGA § 3(a)(3) (1987).
198. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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to abort, little of the first trimester will typically remain before the date of
the abortion. The decision to donate must be made contemporaneously with
the abortion if the tissue is to be useful.
In the case of an ongoing relationship, live-in relationship, or a married
relationship, problems notifying the father usually are reduced. However,
at times even these relationships may present problems. Some of these
relationships are abusive and the woman may have reasons which are
unrelated to the donation decision to fear telling the father. Administering
an exception for situations involving abuse is even more fraught with
problems than locating and consulting fathers in casual relationships would
be. Abortions are not as common in stable relationships, and many women
in such situations will include the father in both abortion and donation
decisions without any legal requirement. While a case can be made for a
legal requirement of paternal consent, at least in cases in which the parents
are married, 2°2 little'is gained by such a requirement. On balance such a
requirement is not worth the problems it can create since most married
women will include their husbands in such decisions anyway. Thus, the only
practical solution is to give decisional authority, as nature has, to the
mother.
VI. RESTRICTIONS ON, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF, DECISIONAL AuTHoRITY
A. State Statutes Prohibiting Fetal Research
About half of the states have enacted legislation placing special restric-
tions on experimentation involving aborted fetuses. 20 3 Each of these states,
however, has enacted the UAGA, and therefore has a policy in favor of
transplantation2 4 and experimentation with donated human tissue from a
person whose death cannot be prevented. Since these states cannot prevent
abortion, statutes preventing the use of fetal tissue are inherently suspect.
202. Of course, a husband and wife who are in the process of seeking a divorce are
considered married until the divorce decree dissolves the marriage. This adds another minor
obstacle to involving the father whenever he is "married" to the mother.
203. Terry, supra note 174, at 446 n.195; Charles H. Baron, Fetal Research: The Question
in the States, 15 HAsTNos Cm. REP., Apr. 1985, at 12, 14-15.
At least one commentator feels that "[s]tate homicide laws can also restrict tissue retrieved
from nonviable ex utero fetuses .... Removal of tissue or organs before death would
constitute murder, if the removal were the immediate cause of death." Frankowska, supra
note 25, at 1110. Since the nonviable fetus cannot be a person after Roe v. Wade, it is not
likely that this statement is true. See Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1980);
Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the
Unborn, 77 MIcH. L. Rav. 1647 (1979); Hess-Mahan, supra note 11, at 810 n.154 (noting that
viability is required for homicide prosecution in most states while live birth is required in
others and giving extensive citations).
204. Indeed, those states which have enacted the 1987 version have so strong an interest
in transplantation that they are prepared to ignore the wishes of the decedent or his family.
See supra notes 20, 164-69 and accompanying text.
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Many amount to little more than legislative temper tantrums, hurled at Roe
v. Wade. Like most temper tantrums, the pain they cause is unrelated to
the wrong they are protesting. In this case, innocent victims of degenerative
diseases suffer.
The nature of the use of fetal tissue that these statutes prohibit varies
widely. Some states prohibit only "experinientation" with aborted fetuses. 205
Once the use of fetal tissue becomes an accepted way of treating a particular
disease, that use will obviously no longer be an "experiment." Further,
even while the use of fetal tissue is experimental, the fetus is not the subject
of the experiment. The subject of the experiment is the person receiving the
fetal cells. Statutes in some states resolve the latter uncertainty by prohibiting
the use of fetal tissue in experimental transplants. 2°6 In these states the
question of whether, and for how long, the treatment is experimental
remains.
Louisiana's statute bars any experimentation on a dead or live fetus
unless the experimentation is therapeutic for the fetus.267 It is not clear how
anything could be therapeutic for a dead fetus. This statute's constitution-
ality was challenged in Margaret S. v. Treen .218 The trial court held that
the statute violated a woman's right to reproductive choice. 209 Obviously,
the statute was enacted as a way of railing against that right, but it is
ineffective in violating the right. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to approve or disapprove the trial
court's reasoning, holding instead that the statute's crucial operative terms
were unconstitutionally vague.
210
Assuming that a redrafted statute can cure the vagueness of terms like
"experiment," the ultimate question would have to be faced. While this
statute hardly interferes with the rights of aborting mothers, it interferes
with the rights of physicians interested in doing fetal tissue research and
patients with degenerative diseases who might be cured. An equal protection
or due process2 ' challenge made by either of these groups must be evaluated.
Ordinarily, such analysis begins with the selection of an appropriate
level of scrutiny.212 The patients with degenerative diseases might well have
205. Frankowska, supra note 25, at 1109.
206. Id. The Arkansas statute, however, goes even further, prohibiting the possession of
an aborted fetus or any part thereof. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-802(d) (Michie 1991). Intended
to preclude all debate about the meaning of experimentation or other such terms, this statute
actually makes abortion -illegal since, no matter how quickly the fetus is disposed of, it will
be "possessed" for at least a short time. Also, the statute may be applied to convict a woman
who has a miscarriage.
207. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West 1992).
208. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
209. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 673-76 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488
F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980) (declaring portions of Louisiana abortion law unconstitutional)
(related case).
210. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1986).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
212. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL, CONSTITTIONAL LAW 696-711 (3d. ed. 1986).
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a more obvious fundamental right than the physicians,2 3 thereby raising the
scrutiny, but the statute will not survive even minimal scrutiny. As applied
to aborted fetuses, the statute lacks even a rational basis. In Margaret S.,
the trial court and a concurring member of the appellate court agreed that
the state had no legitimate interest in providing "greater protection to the
dead fetus than to the deceased [adult] human being. ' '21 4 Both judges noted
that "Louisiana law specifically provides for the use of human corpses for
the purposes of research, La. R.S.A. § 17:2353. ' '21s Depending on one's
view of the more profound questions raised by Roe v. Wade, a pre-viability
fetus is either less than a regular corpse or the same as a regular corpse.
There is no plausible argument for valuing a pre-viability fetus more than
a regular corpse.
Thus, it seems doubtful that state laws designed to prohibit aborted
fetal tissue research, if they can be drafted to avoid vagueness problems,
will be constitutional under any level of scrutiny. These state laws also have
no effect on the number of abortions, although they may be irrationally
intended to do so.
B. Common Law "Quasi-Property" Possessory Rights
In the case of fetal tissue transplants, some of the fetus is not buried,
but is transplanted into a recipient. Given the anticipated demand for fetal
cells for transplantation, the question arises as to who has property rights
in fetal tissue and the amount of entitlement they possess in authorizing
the disposition of their "property." Of specific concern in the fetal tissue
transplantation field is the right which resides at the very core of a property
213. Robertson, supra note 3, at 484-86; Danis, supra note 15, at 1103.
214. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 674-75 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
215. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1986). But see Wynn v. Scott,
449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd
sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). Wynn involved a slightly different
statute prohibiting research or experimentation on any "live" fetus. The same statute raised
a vast number of other abortion-related questions, and no party was held to have standing to
raise the fetal experimentation issue. By way of brief dicta in a lengthy opinion, the trial court
never distinguished between viable and nonviable "live" fetuses, applied minimal scrutiny
without clear justification, and found the statute "rationally related" to a state interest which
the court did not identify. Id. at 1322. Thus, although one student commentator has made a
dubious attempt to distinguish Wynn from Margaret S. based on the difference in the statute,
it is perhaps more accurate to say that Wynn reflects no reasoned analysis of the point. See
Danis, supra note 15, at 1103. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss the issue because
it was not raised on appeal. Wynn, 599 F.2d at 194 (listing sections of statute received on
appeal; list does not include § 6).
See also Charles v. Carey II, 579 F. Supp. 377, 383 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("alive" unconsti-
tutionally vague because it could mean "only the most minimal of life signs in a nonviable
fetus or it could be limited to the capacity of sustained survival"); Charles v. Carey I, 627
F.2d 772, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1980) (earlier appeal involving same litigants). The district court in
Charles v. Carey II distinguished Wynn in a footnote saying that Wynn "did not address the
argument relied upon here." Charles, 579 F. Supp. at 383 n.10.
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interest: the right to possess. 2 6 It is therefore important to determine the
extent and nature of the right the surviving custodian has in the body of
the deceased.
Early American cases adopted the English common law rule that no
property right existed in a dead body.2 7 However, in the absence of any
testamentary disposition, common law courts began to recognize a quasi-
property right in the dead body for the limited purpose of determining who
shall have custody for burial.2 1 This quasi-property, possessory right in the
corpse is usually imposed upon the decedent's next of kin.
21 9
Two reasons are generally given for imposing a quasi-property, posses-
sory interest in a corpse upon the decedent's next of kin. First, public health
necessitates the speedy burial of a corpse.m Because the decedent's relatives
usually have an emotional stake in assuring the remains are treated respect-
fully by burial or cremation, burial of the corpse is generally expedited by
allowing the relatives to have quasi-property rights in the corpse. 221 Second,
because relatives generally derive some benefit from the decedent's estate,
distributional reasons favor allocating responsibility for burial of the remains
to the relatives. 2m
216. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991). The concept of
"property" in the law has been conceptualized as a "bundle of rights." Id. This "bundle of
rights" includes the "rights to possess, to use, to exclude, to profit, and to dispose." Id.
When the UAGA was originally promulgated, the issue of compensation for body parts,
including tissue, was left to the states. UAGA § 3 cmt. (1968). However, amended in 1987,
the UAGA now prohibits the sale and purchase of body parts. UAGA § 10 (1987).
217. See generally 22A AM. Jum. 2D Dead Bodies (1988). Early decisions involving property
rights in dead bodies were concerned with whether the disposition of human remains could be
controlled by will. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481. Because English common law held that no
property right could exist in a dead body, it follows that the dead body cannot be disposed
of by will. 1d.
The common law treatment of dead bodies may be said to have its unfortunate beginnings
with Lord Coke's oft-cited passage:
In every sepulchre that hath a monument, two things are to be considered, viz., the
monument and the sepulture, or burial of the dead. The burial of the cadaver, that
is caro data vermibus [flesh given to the worms] is nullius in bonis [among the
property of no person] and belongs to the ecclesiastical cognizance....
3 EDUARDO COKE, INsTrTUTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 203 (1817), quoted in Cooper, supra
note 84, at 577 (citations omitted). But even the English common law, in a way now
unfortunately overlooked, created a fiction allowing property-like protection for the dead
body. Blackstone states: "Stealing the corpse itself, which has no owner (though a matter of
great indecency) is no felony unless some of the grave cloths be stolen with it." 4 WILIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *236, quoted in Cooper, supra, at 577; see also Roy Hardiman,
Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial
Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986).
218. Terry, supra note 174, at 432-33.
219. Id. at 433. It is interesting that the property right is accurately described as being
imposed on relatives.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 434.
222. Id.
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The common law doctrinal expression of a quasi-property, possessory
right in the decedent's next of kin, however, was delineated before the
decriminalization of abortion, the growth of fetal experimentation, and the
fear of creating a fetus market.? The contemporary common law expression
of this entitlement, therefore, lacks any functional limitation requiring that
the possession of a dead fetus be for the purposes of burial or donation,
but not sale. 4
C. Property Rights in Your Own Body: The Moore Case
Property law generally is not used as a basis to protect against unau-
thorized invasions of an individual's body, but a recent, somewhat unusual
case presented exactly that question. Accordingly, the case will be explored
here in some detail. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,
2
2
the defendants developed a cell line of enormous therapeutic and commercial
value through genetic engineering of the plaintiff's own unique cells without
his consent or knowledge. 6 After learning of the development of the cell
line, Moore brought suit alleging thirteen different causes of action; the
most notable ones being for con-version of his spleen, breach of fiduciary
duty, and lack of informed consent. 227
The trial court dismissed Moore's complaint for failure to state a
claim. 221 In a divided opinion the court of appeals reversed, holding that
the conversion claim stated a cause of action.229 The California Supreme
Court, with two justices dissenting, reversed the appellate court's ruling that
individuals have a general property right in their bodies130 and instead held
Moore stated a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). See generally Laura K. Rebbe, Note, Misrepresentation,
Conversion, and Commercial Human Tissue Research, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 643 (1988) (discussing
Moore decision). But see York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 427 (E.D. Va. 1989) (childless
couple has sufficient property interest in cryogenically preserved human embryo to state cause
of action against fertility institute for breach of contract and in detinue).
226. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481-82 (Cal. 1990). Originally,
Moore had his spleen removed for the treatment of a condition called hairy cell leukemia. Id.
at 480. In advance of the removal of the spleen, however, defendants were aware that Moore's
spleen was unique and that access to the spleen would provide "competitive, commercial, and
scientific advantages." Id. at 481. After the spleen was removed, the defendants developed
and patented a cell line from Moore's cells that produced lymphokines, a genetic product of
considerable commercial value. Id. at 482. Without informing Moore of their research efforts,
the defendants continued to monitor Moore for nontherapeutic reasons for seven years, at
considerable traveling expense for Moore. Id. at 481. Although the clinical potential of each
lymphokine is difficult to predict, the defendants entered into a contract worth over $330,000
for the development of commercial products from the patented cell line over a three year
period. Id. at 482.
227. Id. at 482 & n.4.
228. Id. at 482.
229. Id. at 483.
230. Id. at 490.
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facts material to the patient's consent.Y Analysis of the three main causes
of action follows.
1. The Conversion Claim
Application of the theory of conversion to biological materials from
excised cells would not only create uncertainty about the rights and duties
of specimen sources and users, but also might ultimately deter potentially
beneficial medical research. Recognizing these potential implications of
allowing a conversion claim in biological materials from excised cells, the
California Supreme Court rejected Moore's conversion claim. The court
found that in order to sue for conversion of his spleen, Moore needed to
show that he retained an ownership interest in the cells following their
removal from his body and not just that the cells came from his body.
2
Although the majority avoided the issue of characterizing an individual's
bodily interests, the majority relied on three disparate areas of law in
concluding Moore did not retain a sufficient ownership interest in his cells
following their removal from his body to stake a claim for conversion.2 3
These were (1) decisional law; (2) non-patent statutory law; and (3) patent
law.
a. Decisional Law
Looking first at decisional law, the court noted that no reported judicial
decision recognized that a person had a common law property interest in
their excised cells to support a cause of action for conversion.234 The court
first examined specialized statutes governing such things as "human tissues,
transplantable organs, blood, fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal tissue, and
dead bodies."2 5 The court held that these specialized statutes only regulate
the disposition of human biological materials to achieve societal policy
goals; the statutes are not evidence of a general law of property.
6
Next, the court analyzed decisions concerning privacy rights because no
direct authority existed for importing the law of conversion into the regu-
lation of human biological materials.2 7 The privacy right cases analyzed
concerned decisions which involved wrongful publicity and the patient's
right to refuse medical treatment. Wrongful publicity cases involve opinions
holding that every person has a proprietary interest in his own likeness. In
regard to situations involving the nature of genetic materials and disposition
of human biological materials, the court found the wrongful publicity cases
not relevant because the genetic material used to make a specialized organ
231. Id. at 484-85.
232. Id. at 488-89.
233. Id. at 489.
234. Id.
235. Id. (footnotes omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id.
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is the same in every person and is not specialized to a particular individual. 21
Similarly, the court found in cases involving the patient's right to refuse
medical treatment, that the fiduciary duty and informed consent theories
could protect the marginal privacy and dignity of excised cells because full
disclosure would be required regarding proposed use of excised cells.
Application of Moore's decisional law analysis to the fetal tissue trans-
plant issue yields the following. First, the fetal tissue or organs derived
from an elective abortion procedure should be used to achieve the public
policy goal of benefiting victims of debilitating diseases, rather than serving
individual desires to aid a particular individual. Substantive rules in this
emerging area of law should be fashioned to achieve, rather than restrict,
this policy. Second, because the fetal tissue or organs derived for the
transplant procedure would not be unique to the mother or the father, no
fear of imposition on privacy rights would arise from the subsequent use
of the fetal material. Finally, the ethicists' concerns regarding proper dis-
position of the fetus would still be satisfied because the mother must consent
to the manner in which the fetal cadaver will be disposed.
b. Non-Patent Statutory Law
Next, applying non-patent statutory law to Moore's conversion claim,
the court found that California statutory law drastically limits a patient's
control over excised cells.239 "By restricting how excised cells may be used
and requiring their eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many of
the rights ordinarily attached to property ..... 240 Therefore, one cannot
simply assume that what is left amounts to "property" or "ownership" for
purposes of conversion law. Utilizing this rationale in the fetal tissue context,
it appears that only the remains of the fetus which are not donated might
be considered to be within the mother's control, and then only for the
purpose of disposal. If burial of an intact aborted fetus is desired, a fully
informed woman undergoing the abortion procedure and aware of the
opportunity to donate fetal tissue or organs may always withhold consent
to the subsequent donation of the fetal cadaver.
c. Patent Statutory Law
In finalizing its analysis of the conversion claim, the court analyzed
patent statutory law. The court found that federal law permits the patenting
of organisms that represent the product of "human ingenuity," but not
238. Id. at 490. Biologically, this statement that genetic material used to make a specialized
organ is the same in every person is not accurate, but in the sense in which the court used it,
it is debatable. Obviously, Moore's spleen was genetically unique, although not in appearance
or "likeness." The degree to which the court's biological error affects the point depends on
how one interprets the admittedly imprecise analogy the court is employing.
239. Id. at 491.
240. Id. at 492.
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naturally occurring organisms. 241 Therefore, cell lines are patentable due to
the inventive efforts involved and not because of the discovery of naturally
occurring materials. Thus, any claim to ownership of the transplanted tissue
or the products derived from fetal tissue or organs by a parent in the fetal
tissue transplantation context would be inconsistent with a patent. The
patent is an authoritative determination that the tissue or product derived
from the tissue is the product of an invention and not nature.
Liability for conversion is predicated on a continuing ownership interest.
In deciding whether to create new tort duties in a given area, the court
considered the impact expanded liability would have on the societal function
of biotechnology research. 2 In this case, the application of conversion
liability for ownership in one's own cells would have too broad an impact
on medical research. The uncertainty over whether clear title in the cells
exists would restrict access to necessary raw materials thereby hindering
research. 24 Further, the uncertainty might serve as a deterrent to medical
research because fear of liability would reduce the economic incentive to
conduct important medical research. 2" Thus, no conversion ownership exists
in one's biological materials.
2. The Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Informed Consent Claim
The court held that "a physician who is seeking a patient's consent for
a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to
obtain the patient's informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated
to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect [the
physician's] medical judgment." 24 This holding was based on the rationale
that disclosure of the physician's extraneous motivation was material to the
patient's consent.24 The court then described two scenarios for determining
when the scientific use of cells that have already been removed from the
patient's body no longer affect the patient's interest.24 7 The court held that
if the physician has a pre-existing interest in the patient's cells at the time
he recommends a medical procedure, this interest must be disclosed to the
patient because it might show a conflict of interest affecting. the physician's
advice. Therefore it is "material to the patient's decision and, thus, a
prerequisite to informed consent." 2'" However, in the situation where a
241. Id. at 492 n.35. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding
that creation of nonnaturally occurring organism through human ingenuity is patentable).
242. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 495 (Cal. 1990).
243. Id. at 494.
244. Id. at 495.
245. Id. at 485 (footnote omitted).
246. Id. at 484; see also Sharon N. Perley, Note, From Control Over One's Body to
Control Over One's Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 335 (1992).
247. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 484 (Cal. 1990).
248. Id. "The possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient's health has affected
the physician's judgment is something that a reasonable patient would want to know in deciding
whether to consent to a proposed course of treatment." Id.
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treating physician has "no plans to conduct research on a patient's cells at
the time he recommends the medical procedure by which they are taken,
then the patient's medical interests have not been impaired" 249 and later
scientific use of the removed cells is acceptable.
3. Application of the Moore Decision to Fetal Transplantation
The unauthorized use of fetal tissue in scientific research or transplan-
tation has two effects under the Moore decision. First, medical researchers
or physicians who perform the abortion with a pre-existing interest in
acquiring the fetal tissue may be indirectly liable for subsequent research
or transplantation from aborted fetuses in the absence of maternal consent. 250
Second, if the fetal tissue ends up in a research facility, the subsequent
scientific use of the cells would be permissible regardless of the mother's
consent because the mother's medical interests will no longer be directly
affected.
251
D. The Decedent's Family's Property Right in the Corpse
in Non-Burial Situations
Recently, a court held that the procedural requisites for dealing with
"non-property" human remains in organ donation statutes may change the
characterization of non-property into a special form of property in order
to be allowed protection by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 2 In Brotherton
249. Id.
250. In order to prove damages, however, the mother would have to persuade the trier
of fact that she would not have had the abortion if she had known of her doctor's pre-existing
interest in fetal tissue. This certainly will be a rare case.
251. A woman has an important interest in protecting her health; therefore, the type of
abortion procedure used to minimize her risk may affect the desirability of fetal tissue for
transplant purposes and may directly conflict with the beneficiaries' interest for transplant
purposes. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. A few cases arguably disagree with
Moore, and allow damages for unauthorized research, itself, rather than the conflict of interest
in advising the mother. See McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp., 306 S.E.2d 746, 749 (Ga. App.
1983) (denying summary judgment on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim when
woman, believing hospital had disposed of her stillborn child, was informed that child's body
was in frozen storage and she could pick it up); Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d
133, 140-43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (allowing recovery for breach of contract and punitive
damages when, six weeks after believing hospital had properly disposed of her premature baby,
woman was shown child floating in jar of formaldehyde).
252. See Gregory Gelfand, "Taking" Informational Property Through Discovery, 66
WASH. U. L.Q. 703, 714-18 (1988). Essentially, Professor Gelfand's thesis in this regard is
that there are two sources of "property" for the purposes of takings analysis. First, a core
of "general" property exists, such as the ownership of land, because of the great consensus
among the states and, therefore, in the minds of the drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Second, a state may, by virtue of its own law create property rights, termed
"special" property, which the state was not obligated to create or protect in the first place.
Nonetheless, when the law creates a special property right for all of the citizens of the state,
the state may not then confiscate that property without compensation. Id.
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v. Cleveland,253 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that a widow had a protected property interest in her husband's corneas
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the
removal of corneas was caused by established state procedures .2 4 In Broth-
erton the coroner's office, consistent with its established policy of not
reviewing medical records for the purposes of determining whether consent
was acquired for anatomical gifts, permitted the deceased's corneas to be
removed and used as anatomical gifts despite the widow's refusal to make
an anatomical gift.25 Although the court did not determine how to categorize
the interest in a dead body, the court stated that the state's interest in
implementing the organ/tissue donation program was not substantial enough
to allow the state to consciously disregard those property rights that it had
otherwise granted .2 6 The court found that the policy of the coroner's office
not to review medical records or paperwork pertaining to a corpse for
removal of anatomical parts constituted intentional ignorance and amounted
to a state procedure necessitating predeprivation process.27
The dissent took issue with the majority's opinion that the coroner's
actions, in accordance with the procedures established by state law, consti-
tuted a taking of "property" of the decedent's wife that was protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 25s The dissent argued that Ohio law259
was very clear that no "property" right exists in another person's remains.
260
Organ donation statutes do not speak in terms of "giving property rights
to a surviving relative;" 261 the statutes "make no effort to reexamine
underlying property rights in the body of the decedent; ' 262 and they merely
give the custodial relative the right to consent to organ donation.
263
253. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
254. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991); see also In Re Moyer,
577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978).
255. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
256. Id.; see supra note 252 (detailing creation of property rights by states).
257. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482. See generally Jaffe, supra note 169.
258. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 483 (Joiner, J., dissenting).
259. In the context of creating "special" property, Ohio law would be the source of the
property right. See supra note 252 (describing creation of "special" property by state). For
general property, on the other hand, Ohio law wduld only be relevant as evidence of the
consensus of law on the point. The proposition that Ohio law, in this case the 1968 version
of the UAGA, did not create such "special property" rights is difficult to support, however.
See infra note 263 (noting that UAGA § 2 implicitly creates right to refuse consent).
260. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 483 (Joiner, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Joiner, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (Joiner, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Joiner, J., dissenting). Yet, if the right to "consent" is given, is not the right
to refuse consent inherently given as well? Indeed, the UAGA does not leave the point open
to speculation. If any member of the highest available class of relatives objects, the UAGA
treats this as a refusal such that the other relatives of the same class cannot make a gift, and
the gift cannot be accepted. UAGA § 2(b)-(c) (1968). Further, if the decedent objected during
his lifetime no gift can be made. Id. § 2(b). Ironically, it is arguable that the 1987 version,
by giving the same rights in section 3, but purposely ignoring them procedurally in section 4,
is, itself, an unconstitutional taking of the property it creates. See supra notes 164-69 and
accompanying text (describing UAGA § 4).
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Although most courts recognize that the family has a substantial quasi-
property right to dispose of a corpse, the state legislature may, arguably,
modify or abrogate the right of action existing at common law.2 Thus,
perhaps, the family's right of possession and disposition of a corpse can be
modified if the state has an overriding interest in obtaining organ donations.
For example, in State v. PowelP65 the court held that the state interest in
providing sight to blind citizens was great enough to allow removal of
corneal tissue from a corpse without notice to next of kin. 26 In Georgia
Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,267 the court held that the removal of
corneal tissue from decedents for transplant is constitutional when no
objection is made by the decedent during his life or by his next of kin,
who do not get notice to enable them to object, after death.26 Therefore
it would seem that the state may, in the interest of public welfare, require
the subsequent donation of the aborted fetus absent-or possibly even in
the face of-explicit directions or notification of the decedent's next of
kin. 269 Given the resistance to fetal tissue transplants, however irrational, it
is unlikely that states will enact such laws.
E. State Cadaver and Fetus Disposal Statutes
Until the possible uses of fetuses in medical transplants became known,
fetal remains had little value. At common law, cadaver disposal was limited
by the state's inherent power to regulate matters of public health.270 This
generally required the disposition of the corpse to be done in such a manner
that it would not "be regarded as creating a nuisance, be offensive to the
sense of decency, or be injurious to the health of the community." 27'
However, once abortion was legalized, the states started to specifically
regulate the mode of fetal disposal. 272 Specific disposal statutes generally
place a duty on the physician-abortionist to require a sanitary removal of
aborted fetal remains. 273 For the most part, disposal requirements have been
264. Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985). Because Georgia
has the UAGA in effect, considerable doubt is cast upon this decision by Brotherton v.
Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
265. 497 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1986).
266. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1118, 1191 (Fla. 1986). But see Brotherton, 923 F.2d at
477.
267. 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
268. Georgia Lion's Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985). But see
supra note 263 (criticizing similar provision in 1987 version of UAGA as unconstitutional).
269. This view is not endorsed by either of the authors.
270. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 174, at 426.
271. Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W. 871, 873 (1912).
272. Terry, supra note 174, at 428.
273. See, e.g., ARK. CODE AN. § 20-17-802(a) (Michie 1991) (stating that fetal remains
and all parts thereof must be disposed of in manner similar to that in which other human
tissue is disposed); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25957(a) (West 1984) ("[Fletal remains
shall be promptly interred or disposed of by incineration."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(7)
(West Supp. 1993) ("Fetal remains shall be disposed of in a sanitary and appropriate manner
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upheld under the state's public health and safety power in exercising control
of the burials of the dead. 274 However, some of these disposal statutes have
been successfully challenged for vagueness or for unduly burdening a
woman's decision to abort.
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,275 the
Court found the disposal statute to be impermissively vague. 276 In that case,
the Court struck down an ordinance which provided, "[a]ny physician who
shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman shall insure
that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane and
sanitary manner. ' 277 Although the Court recognized that the city had a
"legitimate interest in proper disposal of fetal remains, ' 278 the ordinance
was fatally unclear as to whether the provision mandated a 'decent burial'
of [the] embryo at the earliest stages of formation.
' 279
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists,280 a majority of the Court denounced the practice of requiring that
women considering abortion be provided with intentionally inflammatory
information through a mandatory "informed consent" recital. 28' The Court
said, "[tihe states are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal
health ... to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies[,] ... wholly
subordinat[ing] constitutional privacy interests ... in an effort to deter a
woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make.
'282
Disposal statutes also may be found unconstitutional under Thornburgh
if they impermissibly interfere with the woman's decision to have an
abortion. In Margaret S. v. Treen, 283 the district court held Louisiama's fetal
and in accordance with standard health practices.").
If, however, the sole concern of these statutes is the public health and safety, it is
surprising that no similar provisions are made in the statutes for the sanitary disposal of other
surgically removed body parts. A leg amputated from an adult, for example, would have more
potentially dangerous tissue than a fetus. It would appear, therefore, that these statutes are,
as a group, constitutionally suspect attempts to strike out at abortion. Cf. Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1986) (Williams, J., concurring) (holding that Louisiana
law that prohibited research on fetal tissue, but not on other human remains, was state action
undertaken to discourage constitutionally privileged abortions).
274. See generally Terry, supra note 174, at 428.
275. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
276. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 424 n.7 (1983).
277. Id. at 424 n.7 (quoting AKRON, OHIO, CODIMD ORDI ANCES, ch. 1870, § 1870.16
(1978)); see also supra note 273.
278. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 452 n.45.
279. Id. at 451 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 651 F.2d 1198,
1211 (6th Cir. 1981)) (Sixth Circuit's opinion in same case); see also Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1392 (6th Cir. 1987).
280. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
281. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
760-71 (1986).
282. Id. at 759.
283. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit did not reverse on the ground for
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disposal provisions, enacted along with the previously discussed restrictions
on fetal research, unconstitutional because they placed impermissible psy-
chological burdens on the woman's decision to abort. The district court
found the statute placed an impermissible psychological burden on the
pregnant woman because the statute forced her to consider whether her
aborted fetus should be cremated or buried.2 In addition, the court found
that the statute placed an impermissible burden upon a pregnant woman
because the statute equated the disposal of a fetus with the disposal of a
person. 211 In later proceedings concerning the same statute, 28 6 the court again
was asked to consider the validity of the Louisiana state disposal statute.
In Louisiana the provision required the doctor-abortionist personally to
inform the woman about options for disposal of fetal remains within twenty-
four hours of the abortion.217 The court held that the provision constituted
a direct burden on pregnant women's abortion rights because information
regarding how the fetus would be disposed of was intended to place a
psychological burden on the woman as in Thornburghu8
How much remains of this prohibition against placing a psychological
burden on the right to abortion is unclear. Recent Supreme Court decisions
make it clear that the state and federal governments may take a stand
against abortion, even though it remains a constitutional right.219 This creates
somewhat of a contradiction the Court has yet to resolve-that of the
government in opposition to its own constitution. The contradiction is not
absolute. It is possible, although problematic, for the government to say,
"you have the right, but it is wrong for you to exercise it." It is, however,
a house divided against itself; it undermines the right and undermines the
greater idea of countermajoritarian rights. One need only apply the Court's
logic to other constitutional rights to see the difficulties more clearly. Would
we allow the government to take the position that, while it cannot stop you
from being a Catholic, Hindu, or Democrat, 290 it is wrong for you to do
so?
the trial court's decision, but held the statute impermissibly vague, saying, "[blecause there
are clearer and narrower grounds on which this statutory provision must be declared uncon-
stitutional, we need not approve or disapprove the rationales relied on by the district court."
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 944, 998 (5th Cir. 1986).
284. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 222-23 (E.D. La. 1980) (prior ruling
concerning predecessor statute); see also Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351-52 (D.N.D.
1980).
285. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. at 222.
286. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
287. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.14(C) (West Supp. 1992). The provision in
pertinent part reads: "The attending physician shall inform each woman upon whom he
performs or induces an abortion of the provisions of this Subsection within twenty-four hours
after the abortion is performed or induced." Id.
288. Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 670-71.
289. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977).
290. We might have included the term "Atheist" in the text as well. However, the Court,
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If anything remains of the "psychological burden" argument, then,
ironically, the government probably may not take too strong a stance in
favor of the donation of fetal tissue for transplants and research. A legal
requirement that doctors press the issue on aborting mothers, or a require-
ment or presumption that fetuses be donated may well place a significant
psychological burden on mothers choosing abortion. 29 ' This is so because it
would force them to think about the fetus used in such a way, or force
them to accept its use for transplant rather than leaving it intact, as part
of the price of having an abortion. The matter is best left in private hands,
with doctors presenting the request if they wish to. 292 Private conduct does
not pose the constitutional problems.
29a
VII. CONCLUSION
Today, it is generally accepted that tissue or organs may be removed
from a cadaver for pathologic analysis, research, or for transplantation. A
new technique called fetal tissue transplantation has the potential of treating
approximately five million American patients who suffer from degenerative
diseases merely by salvaging the tissue from electively aborted fetuses. 294
Indeed, if the technique were to be successful in the treatment of AIDS,
the number of saved lives could be astronomical. The number of lives that
could be saved each year might exceed the loss of life through abortions.
Salvaging tissue from an aborted nonviable fetus is consistent with, and
medically preferable to, organ donation from an adult human cadaver and
should be used to benefit the millions of victims who suffer from degen-
erative diseases.
The controversy surrounding abortion has no real bearing on the use
of fetal tissue. A few uncritical reports to the contrary not withstanding,
no increase in abortions will occur even if use of fetal tissue transplants
becomes widespread. The success of fetal transplantation techniques might
itself, incessantly disregards the rights of Atheists becauses it opens its sessions every day with
the crier's call, "God save this Honorable Court .... ." See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983) (upholding similar official state legislature prayer as "non-sectarian;" apparently
Atheists are not "sect" for purposes of First Amendment).
291. Ironically, this is one more reason why those who oppose abortion should favor
fetal transplant research. Prohibiting the research does not discourage abortions. Forcing
aborting mothers to consider donating the fetal tissue may discourage a few such mothers
from aborting. Cf. Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351-52 (D.N.D. 1980).
292. Notably, doctors would not be required to request the mother's permission and might
not do so in every case, depending on a number of factors such as the wisdom of doing so
in view of the emotional situation of the aborting patient.
293. But see supra note 290. A private individual can, of course, tell anyone he wishes,
"Don't be a Catholic (Hindu, Democrat, Atheist)." Private individuals may be subjected to
constitutional restrictions not relevant here. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
294. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing potential of fetal tissue
research for curing many diseases). These figures are for the United States alone. On a world-
wide scale, far more than five million people could be treated if the research proves successful.
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be seen as tipping the balance in favor of keeping abortion legal. If this is
so, it is inevitable. As long as the use of human cadavers does not contradict
commonly held and legally enforced convictions about respect for the dead,
it is irrelevant whether the tissue is acquired from a deceased fetus, a
deceased child, or a deceased adult. The key is that the death would have
occurred anyway. Decisions to abort are made to stop unwanted pregnancies;
the later decision to donate fetal tissue is a logically separate act. The choice
to donate fetal tissue should and, as a practical matter must, remain solely
with the mother. So long as ethical guidelines separate, as much as possible,
a woman's decision to abort from her decision to donate fetal tissue for
transplantation, salvaging tissue from an aborted nonviable fetus is consis-
tent with organ donation from any human cadaver. The availability of fetal
tissue and the potential for relief that the technology offers to the five
million victims of degenerative diseases outweighs the illogical but perceived
ethical and moral dilemmas this technology presents.
